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SHOULD MUTUAL FUNDS
INVEST IN STARTUPS?
A CASE STUDY OF FIDELITY MAGELLAN
FUND’S INVESTMENTS IN UNICORNS (AND
OTHER STARTUPS) AND THE REGULATORY
IMPLICATIONS*
JEFF SCHWARTZ**
Mutual funds are acting like venture capitalists. Contrary to
longstanding practice and to their reputation for investing in
public companies, mutual funds, including some of the most
prominent, are allocating portions of their portfolios to private
venture-stage firms, including famous unicorns like Airbnb and
Uber. Through a case study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s startup
portfolio, this Article analyzes the regulatory implications of this
development. I argue that the new interest in venture investing
poses several potential investor-protection concerns: lack of
awareness among mutual fund investors, lack of liquidity for
mutual fund shares, lack of venture capital expertise among
mutual fund management, and lack of accountability over how
funds value their ownership stakes in startups for purposes of
calculating their net asset values, which creates an opportunity
for management to manipulate such estimates.
Based on Magellan’s practices, liquidity is not a salient concern,
but the other gaps appear significant. Magellan’s disclosures on
its website, and in its prospectus, statement of additional
information, and quarterly reports, provide investors with little
meaningful information about the fund’s investments in startups.
They also provide nothing to suggest that Magellan has
experience in this area. At the same time, however, the fund
reports returns from its startup portfolio that far exceed the
public market and the average in the venture capital industry.
While exceptional performance from a novice does not prove
* © 2017 Jeff Schwartz.
** William H. Leary Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of
Law. I would like to thank the organizers of the North Carolina Law Review’s symposium
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misconduct, it reinforces concerns about the dependability of
fund valuations.
To address the above risks, I suggest new rules governing how
mutual funds value their startup investments, which tie changes
to objective evidence, and new disclosure requirements that
would shed light on the rationale for valuation changes and
provide mutual fund investors with notice that startups are in
their portfolios and that these investments pose certain risks.
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INTRODUCTION
Much has been made of the proliferation of “unicorns,” startups
with valuations of at least $1 billion.1 The neologism, coined at a time
when such firms were rare,2 now comes with an ironic twist, as these
firms now seem to be everywhere.3 One trend that has fueled their
rise, but attracted far less attention than the unicorns themselves, is
that mutual funds—the somewhat stodgy savings tool for retail
investors with an eye towards retirement4—have begun to act like
venture capital funds—the flashy portfolio ornament for wealthy
individuals and institutional investors.5 In a break with their past,
mutual funds have begun investing significant sums in these young
private firms.6

1. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Main Street Portfolios Are Investing in Unicorns, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook
/main-street-portfolios-are-investing-in-unicorns.html [https://perma.cc/X4GR-WGFX].
2. See Aileen Lee, Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion-Dollar
Startups, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/welcome-tothe-unicorn-club/ [https://perma.cc/5K4S-DR5U] (coining the term).
3. See Scott Austin, Chris Canipe & Sarah Slobin, The Billion Dollar Startup Club,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2015), http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club/ [https://perma.cc
/D57A-THDL] (showing list and valuation of firms as of May 2017); Ben Zimmer, How
‘Unicorns’ Became Silicon Valley Companies, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2015, 10:26 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-unicorns-became-silicon-valley-companies-1426861606.
4. See Kimberly Burham, Michael Bogdan & Daniel Schrass, Characteristics of
Mutual Fund Investors, 2014, 20 ICI RES. PERSP., no. 9, Nov. 2014, at 1,
https://www.idc.org/pdf/per20-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZY5-JU7Q].
5. See Chad Brooks, What Is Venture Capital?, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Apr. 1, 2013,
12:16 PM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4252-venture-capital.html [https://perma.cc
/F8S2-ESKJ].
6. See Sergey Chernenko, Josh Lerner & Yao Zeng, Mutual Funds as Venture
Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns 30 fig.1 (Jan. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897254 [https://perma.cc/TW93-7U9C
(staff-uploaded archive)]; Tim McLaughlin & Heather Somerville, U.S. Mutual Funds
Boost Own Performance with Unicorn Mark-Ups, REUTERS (Aug. 11, 2016, 7:03 AM),

95 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2017)

1344

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

This Article analyzes the regulatory implications that arise from
mutual funds amassing venture-capital-type portfolios. I argue that
their investments in startups pose several potential concerns. One is
investor awareness. Since venture investing runs counter to historical
practices,7 mutual fund investors might not realize that their funds are
purchasing these atypical assets. Another concern is liquidity.
Investors expect to be able to redeem mutual fund shares nearly
instantly.8 Since startups are private, however, their shares do not
trade on a liquid market, which makes it more difficult for mutual
funds to meet their shareholders’ redemption expectations.
Finally, these investments raise concerns about competence and
candor. Mutual fund portfolio managers are not typically experts in
venture capital valuation, which casts their investing decisions in this
arena into doubt. Moreover, once they have made these investments,
funds are required to value them each day.9 With no market price to
go on, the valuations are within management’s discretion.10 The
values managers posit impact the price that shareholders receive
when they cash out and what newcomers pay when they invest.11
Because mutual fund managers lack the experience and expertise to
appropriately value their startup holdings, these prices might be
inaccurate.
Fund discretion in valuation also creates the potential for
misconduct. Funds are incentivized to choose high values, which
among other benefits to the fund, makes them appear more successful
than their peers and increases the fees collected from investors.12
They might also be tempted to smooth returns, that is, report losses

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-valuations-idUSKCN10M0CP [https://perma.cc/7NQ2TUJ9].
7. See supra text accompanying note 6.
8. See Mutual Funds and Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs)—A Guide for Investors,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm [https://perma
.cc/GQF7-LJCQ] [hereinafter Guide for Investors] (last updated Jan. 26, 2017).
9. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(b)(1) (2016).
10. See infra Section II.C.
11. See infra Section II.C.1.
12. See infra Section II.C.3. While this concern has drawn little attention, funds have
made headlines for marking down the values of their startups. See, e.g., Rolfe Winkler,
Fidelity Marks Down Startups Including Dropbox, Zenefits, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2016,
1:34 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fidelity-marks-down-startups-including-dropboxzenefits-1459346847; Rolfe Winkler, T. Rowe Price Marks Down Most of Its Tech Startups,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2016, 6:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/t-rowe-price-marksdown-most-of-its-tech-startups-1460759094.
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and gains when most advantageous for the fund rather than when
they occur.13
This range of concerns should sound familiar to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). While mutual fund interest
in startups is a new phenomenon, many have long invested in other
illiquid assets, such as mature private firms14 and thinly traded debt
instruments,15 which expose investors to risks similar to those noted
above.16 That being the case, the securities laws contain rules that are
at least partially responsive. The pertinent issues are, therefore,
whether the existing, generally applicable, regulatory regime is
sufficiently robust to handle venture-capital style investing or
whether, and if so what, specially tailored rules might be advisable. I
argue that entry into this new arena presents novel types and degrees
of risk and, because of this, suggest targeted reforms that would
mitigate the investor-protection concerns that result.
To assess the extent to which risks to investors remain despite
existing safeguards, I describe the relevant rules, present a case study
of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s compliance therewith, and scrutinize the
fund’s startup valuations. Magellan is an iconic mutual fund. It is
actively managed,17 which means its portfolio managers select
securities with the hopes of beating the stock market’s return rather
than duplicating it like an index fund,18 and it has about $15 billion in
assets and 156 million shares outstanding,19 making it one of the
13. For a discussion of smoothing, see AHMED RIAHI-BELKAOUI, ACCOUNTING
THEORY 56 (5th ed. 2004).
14. See Restricted Securities, Accounting Series Release No. 113, Investment
Company Act Release No. 5847, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,989, 19,989 (Oct. 21, 1969).
15. See generally Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Securities
Act Release No. 9616, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736 (July 23, 2014) [hereinafter Money Market
Fund Reform] (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 274, 279) (discussing mutual fund
investments in illiquid debt).
16. Mutual fund liquidity has arisen as a concern at the SEC of late, as funds have
increasingly diversified their holdings. See Kara M. Stein, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Mutual Funds—The Next 75 Years, Address to the Brookings Institution
(June 15, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/mutual-funds-the-next-75-yearsstein.html#_ftnref35 [https://perma.cc/7U4U-98PX].
17. See Brett Owens, Secure Your Retirement with These Top 4 Fidelity Funds,
FORBES (Jan. 29, 2017, 8:36 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brettowens/2017/01/29
/secure-your-retirement-with-these-top-4-fidelity-funds/#7e31cd603e0c [https://perma.cc
/6UPF-GB9A (staff-uploaded archive)].
18. See VANGUARD, ACTIVE AND PASSIVE INVESTING: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
2 (2016), https://www.vanguard.co.uk/documents/adv/literature/client_material/activepassive-investing-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JX4-Y6UK].
19. See Fidelity Magellan Fund: Summary, FIDELITY, https://fundresearch.fidelity.com
/mutual-funds/summary/316184100 [https://perma.cc/MYZ5-4QCL]. The number of shares
was calculated by dividing portfolio net assets by the fund’s net asset value.
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largest and most popular actively managed equity mutual funds.20
Most significantly, the fund is also an active investor in unicorns and,
as it turns out, other startups.21
There are several reasons why Magellan is an attractive fund on
which to focus. Because it is an industry leader with the resources to
hire top counsel, its valuation processes and compliance activities are
likely suggestive of larger industry practices, and, more specifically,
because it is a Fidelity fund, its practices are likely suggestive of those
in Fidelity’s fund family, which has been at the forefront of startup
investing.22 In addition, even if Magellan is an outlier in its approach
to these securities, to the extent its practices raise investor-protection
concerns, its scale means that a significant number of individuals
could be harmed. This alone would warrant regulatory scrutiny.
Based on the above three-step analysis of risk, regulation, and
case-study data, I conclude that, while liquidity does not appear to be
a concern, there is reason to suspect that investors fail to realize that
their mutual funds are investing in unicorns (and potentially other
startups), that mutual fund investments in these securities are
inadequately informed, and that the valuations that mutual funds
report publicly and serve as the basis of redemptions and purchases
may be inflated. The most significant findings are that Magellan’s
disclosures surrounding its startup investments and its valuation
practices are opaque, and that its reported valuations indicate that the
fund has done surprisingly well with this portion of its portfolio.23 Its
reported returns far outpace its other investments, the venture capital
industry, and the public markets.24 Such success does not necessarily
indicate misconduct—it may owe to luck or skill that belies the fund’s
inexperience. Greater oversight, however, would provide increased
confidence that the outstanding performance owes to these benign
explanations.
While a study solely of Magellan’s practices cannot prove reform
is necessary, the findings and analysis herein lend credence to
20. See William Baldwin, Mutual Fund Ratings: The Biggest Domestic-Stock Funds,
FORBES (June 26, 2015, 5:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/baldwin/2015/06/26
/mutual-fund-ratings-the-biggest-domestic-stock-funds/#4d7d69dd276b [https://perma
.cc/M5HY-C4LQ (staff-uploaded archive)].
21. See infra Table 1.
22. See Chernenko et al., supra note 6, at 19; Beth Healy, Fidelity Funds High on Hot
Startups, BOS. GLOBE (Jan 13, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/01/13
/fidelity-funds-high-hot-startups/ZzJMQHiFbLjBMsd2MNSNxM/story.html [https://perma.cc
/A9HH-D2PS (staff-uploaded archive)].
23. See infra Sections II.C.5.c, II.C.6.c.
24. See infra Section II.C.6.c.
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investor-protection concerns and, therefore, suggest that reforms are
worth consideration. I argue for stricter rules regarding startup
valuation methods and enhanced disclosures related to the venture
portion of fund portfolios.25
To limit the discretion over valuations that funds enjoy today, I
suggest that rules should mandate valuation changes when, and only
when, they are based on publicly available information. Funds would
also be required to publicly disclose the information on which such
changes are based. To improve investor awareness, I propose rules
that would mandate prominent disclosure of the presence of venturestage investments and the risks they pose. Disclosures of varying
length and specificity would be necessary in certain advertisements
and in several mandated filings, including the fund’s prospectus (its
primary sales document) and its statement of additional information
(the “SAI”) (a supplement to the prospectus with additional detail),
the latter of which would contain a separate section devoted to the
startup portion of the fund’s portfolio. This combination of
substantive restraints and additional transparency requirements
would enhance the credibility of valuations and provide investors with
adequate notice that their fund is involved in the venture capital
arena.26
Part I of this Article describes the rise of unicorns and the
corresponding rise of mutual fund investments therein, the history of
Fidelity’s Magellan Fund, and the makeup of Magellan’s venturestage portfolio. In Part II, I discuss the investor-protection concerns
that mutual fund investments in venture-stage firms give rise to and
assess—through a juxtaposition of the current regulatory structure
against Magellan’s investing, valuation, and compliance practices—
whether today’s regulations are sufficient to protect investors. The
analysis reveals gaps with respect to investor awareness and fund
valuation practices for emerging firms. Part III proposes reforms that
would mitigate these concerns.

25. See infra Part III.
26. Because investors have historically shown muted interest in fund disclosures,
mandating additional transparency would have only a qualified impact. See ABT SRBI,
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS TELEPHONE SURVEY 56, 78 (2008), https://www
.sec.gov/pdf/disclosuredocs.pdf [https://perma.cc/WER9-RW67] (finding that almost twothirds of a sample of 1000 investors rarely, very rarely, or never read mutual fund
prospectuses). Improved disclosures, however, would reach some investors, and provide
constructive notice that legitimizes the new practice of investing in startups. Disclosure
reform therefore serves as a worthwhile complement to the substantive portion of this
Article’s proposal, which would protect everyone regardless of their willingness and ability
to read and understand fund disclosure documents.
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I. UNICORNS, MUTUAL FUNDS, AND MAGELLAN
A. The Proliferation of Unicorns
Unicorns have upended norms in entrepreneurial capital raising,
and, in so doing, have captured the attention of a growing number of
mutual fund managers. There are currently 157 unicorns,27 with
Dropbox, Airbnb, and Uber among the most famous. Indeed, all of
these companies are valued at over $10 billion, which qualifies them
for “decacorn” status.28 Like these well-known firms, unicorns tend,
by and large, to be Silicon Valley-based technology companies.29
Conventionally, companies with such rich valuations would go
public to allow founders, employees, and early-stage investors to cash
in on the firm’s success. Unicorns, however, have shunned this path.30
Travis Kalanick, the controversial CEO of Uber, captured the
prevailing sentiment when he said that he would take the company
public “one day before [his] employees and significant others come to
[his] office with pitchforks and torches.”31
To remain private, these companies raise money under
Rule 506(b) of the securities laws.32 So long as they limit participation
to “accredited investors” and comply with several other restrictions,
the rule allows them to collect round after round of venture capital
without having to publicly register or provide investors with any
specific disclosures.33 The rules define accredited investors as

27. See Austin et al., supra note 3.
28. See id.; Sarah Frier & Eric Newcomer, The Fuzzy, Insane Math That’s Creating So
Many Billion-Dollar Tech Companies, BLOOMBERG: TECH (Mar. 17, 2015, 9:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insane-math-that-s-creatingso-many-billion-dollar-tech-companies [https://perma.cc/NTD5-XHE8] (noting use of the
“decacorn” terminology).
29. See Frier & Newcomer, supra note 28.
30. See Jim Kerstetter, Daily Report: When Employees Want to Cash Out Private
Stock, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/technology/dailyreport-when-employees-want-to-cash-out-private-stock.html [https://perma.cc/TZ2L5W7W] (“It has become common wisdom among tech start-ups that an initial public
offering of shares is something that should occur only after all other options have been
exhausted.”).
31. Kevin Maney, Silicon Valley Is Hoarding Wealth by Skipping IPOs, NEWSWEEK
(June 27, 2016, 9:25 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/07/08/silicon-valley-unicornsipo-474898.html [https://perma.cc/TCU9-QZBA]. For a broader discussion on the decline
in IPOs and potential explanations, see generally Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity
Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531 (2012).
32. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2016); see also Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns:
Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 592 (2016) (“Typically
venture-backed companies rely on Rule 506(b) . . . .”).
33. See § 230.506(b).
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individuals and institutions that meet certain financial thresholds.34
Individuals must have a net worth of greater than $1 million
(excluding their principal residence) or sustained income of greater
than $200,000 per year,35 while institutions must have greater than $5
million in assets.36
Typical startup investors include “angels” and venture capital
funds.37 Angels tend to be wealthy individuals who qualify as
accredited investors.38 Venture capital funds range in size, but they
can have over a billion dollars in assets under management in their
family of funds.39 The investors in venture capital funds, technically
limited partners, are all accredited.40 It is only recently that mutual
funds have shown interest in putting their enormous resources behind
emerging firms.41 Funds from the largest families, including
Vanguard, Fidelity, and Blackrock, have lately begun steering
investor assets toward unicorns.42 Allocations have risen sharply over
the last few years and now total over $10 billion spread across over
250 funds,43 with Fidelity’s funds leading the way.44 And while nascent
statistics focus on unicorn investments, other startups might be on
fund ledgers as well. One surprise from this Article’s study of
Fidelity’s Magellan Fund is that it has reached beyond these giants of
the startup world.45
While angel and venture capital investing is generally confined to
accredited investors, anyone can invest in the mutual funds run by
these well-known fund families and their peers.46 Mutual fund

34. See id. § 230.501(a).
35. See id. § 230.501(a)(6)–(7).
36. See id. § 230.501(a)(3).
37. See Stephen G. Morrissette, A Profile of Angel Investors, 10 J. PRIV. EQUITY 52,
52 (2007).
38. See id. at 54.
39. See Tanya Benedicto Klich, VC 100: The Top Investors in Early-Stage Startups,
ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/242702 [https://
perma.cc/M3KY-RK5F].
40. See Jeffrey Estes, Benedict Kwon & Michael Brown, Venture Capital Investment
in the United States: Market and Regulatory Overview, PRAC. L. (Mar. 1, 2015), http://us
.practicallaw.com/7-501-0057?source=relatedcontent [https://perma.cc/KXD6-ZGNG].
41. See supra text accompanying note 6.
42. Scott Austin et al., Startup Stock Tracker, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2017, 1:20 PM),
http://graphics.wsj.com/tech-startup-stocks-to-watch/ [https://perma.cc/K22B-K27S] (charting
mutual fund investments in startup stocks).
43. See Chernenko et al., supra note 6, at 30 fig.1.
44. Id. at 19; Healy, supra note 22.
45. See infra Table 1.
46. See Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 521, 521 (2009); see also MUTUAL FUND EDUC. CTR., http://mfea.com
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investors are not wealthy individuals seeking out risky investments in
young companies. They are retail investors, many of whom take part
in mutual funds through their workplace 401(k) plans.47 While angels
and venture capital limited partners are likely to be sophisticated
parties (or at the very least have an interest in and understanding of
investing), mutual fund investors likely give investing little thought.
They may even fear and dislike investing, but participate in mutual
funds anyway because they have no other option to save for
retirement.48 They are among the least sophisticated investors in the
securities markets.49 If anyone needs protection in the venture capital
space, it is them.
B.

Fidelity’s Magellan Fund

Magellan concentrates its investing in the publicly traded equities
of large U.S. companies, but it has a pronounced newfound interest in
startups.50 Founded in 1963, Magellan grew from $18 million in assets
under management in 1977 to $19 billion in 1990 under the acclaimed
investor, Peter Lynch, who averaged a 29.2% annual return.51 Even
after Lynch’s tenure, the fund continued to prosper. In 2000, it was
worth $110 billion.52
More recently, however, Magellan has struggled. Over the last
ten years, it has trailed the S&P 500 Index, as well as peer funds.53 As
/learn/mutual_funds/why_mutual_funds/content_tabbed/default.fs [https://perma.cc/K6ZUY7L4].
47. See Jeff Schwartz, Rethinking 401(k)s, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 53, 56–57 (2012); see
also Investing in Your 401(k), FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://www.finra.org/investors
/investing-your-401k [https://perma.cc/8D43-8TKP].
48. See Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 256–57
(2010); see also Investing in Your 401(k), supra note 47.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48. Ninety-seven percent of mutual fund
shares are owned by individual investors rather than institutions. See Sean Collins, The
IMF on Asset Management: Sorting the Retail and Institutional Investor “Herds”, ICI
VIEWPOINTS (June 4, 2015), https://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_15_imf_gfsr_05 [https://
perma.cc/RQE9-LYQF].
50. See Fidelity Magellan Fund: Composition, FIDELITY, https://fundresearch.fidelity
.com/mutual-funds/composition/316184100 [http://perma.cc/754G-XQ9Q] (showing
composition as of March 31, 2017).
51. Matthew Schifrin, Peter Lynch: 10-Bagger Tales, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2009, 6:00
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/23/lynch-fidelity-magellan-personal-finance_peter_lynch
.html [https://perma.cc/46A7-AKMR (staff-uploaded archive)]; see also Fidelity Magellan
Fund: Summary, supra note 19.
52. Eleanor Laise, Can Anyone Steer This Ship?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2011, 12:01
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704547604576263183921903172.
53. See FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS 5 (May 28, 2016) [hereinafter
FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS]; see also Fidelity Magellan Fund: Summary,
supra note 19.
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a result, it has suffered massive shareholder redemptions54 and
currently has assets under management of $15.5 billion, a large figure
to be sure but one well beneath its peak.55 While Magellan is still one
of the largest equity mutual funds, its rivals have gained at its
expense.56
The fund is also likely a victim of broader headwinds facing
actively managed mutual funds. Empirical evidence has shown that
investing in such funds is a poor choice. They routinely yield subpar
returns and charge high fees, leaving investors worse off than if they
had put their money in passively managed index funds.57 While the
futility of active management has been known for some time,58 this
knowledge has only recently had a major impact on investor decision
making. Index funds are now seizing sizable chunks of market share.59
In fact, the threat index funds pose may partially explain the startupinvesting trend. Since there is no venture-capital index for passively
managed funds to track, they cannot follow actively managed funds
into this unexplored territory.
The Table below shows Magellan’s venture investments.60 It has
invested a total of about $134 million since the second quarter of 2012
(when its interest in startups appears to have begun).61 It held
seventeen unique investments in twelve companies during the period

54. See Katy Marquardt, Fidelity Magellan on Its New Course, KIPLINGER (Nov. 16,
2006), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/investing/T041-C009-S001-fidelity-magellan-on-itsnew-course.html [https://perma.cc/7C3U-KNZM].
55. See Fidelity Magellan Fund: Summary, supra note 19 (showing $15.5 billion in
portfolio net assets as of May 3, 2017); see also Laise, supra note 52.
56. See Baldwin, supra note 20 (including a table showing Magellan’s recent size
ranking among top equity funds).
57. See Laise, supra note 52.
58. See, e.g., Anne M. Tucker, The Outside Investor: Citizen Shareholders &
Corporate Alienation, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 99, 139 (2013) (noting that “[t]he fees
associated with active management and attempts to consistently beat the market are
‘widely believed by experts to be a futile practice.’ ”(quoting Matthew D. Hutcheson,
Uncovering and Understanding Hidden Fees in Qualified Retirement Plans, 15 ELDER L.J.
323, 345 (2007))).
59. See id.; Jason Zweig, Are Index Funds Eating the World?, WALL ST. J.:
MONEYBEAT (Aug. 26, 2016, 11:46 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/08/26/areindex-funds-eating-the-world/.
60. The data in the table is based upon Fidelity Magellan Fund’s quarterly N-CSR
and N-Q reports filed with the SEC between June 2012 and March 2016. For a collection
of these filings and reports, see generally EDGAR Search Results: Fidelity Magellan Fund
CIK#: 0000061397, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar
?company=fidelity+magellan&match=&CIK=&filenum=&State=&Country=&SIC=&owner
=exclude&Find=Find+Companies&action=getcompany [https://perma.cc/JYP7-VDRZ].
61. I reviewed all SEC quarterly filings going back to the fourth quarter of 2009 until
March 2016. No startup investments appeared prior to the June 2012 filing. See id.
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under review—the sixteen quarters beginning June 2012 and ending
March 2016. While seven out of Magellan’s twelve venture
investments are in unicorns, the Table shows that Magellan has been
willing to invest in smaller startups as well. In addition, two of the
firms—Meituan and Mobileye—are international companies (Chinaand Israel-based, respectively).62 Some of the firms listed below have
gone public, but they were all private at the time of Magellan’s
acquisition.
Table 1: Fidelity Magellan Fund Startup Investments

Company

Acquisition
Date

Acquisition
Price per
Share ($)

Investment
Amount ($)

bluebird bio, Inc.*

July 23, 2012

.50

1,711,000

Cloudflare, Inc.†

Nov. 5, 2014

6.13

3,502,000

Oct. 21, 2013

5.56

90,000

Mar. 3, 2014

13.18

99,000

Mar. 3, 2014

13.34

30,000

June 29, 2012

4.64

11,000,000

Mar. 3, 2014

13.17

71,000

Mar. 3, 2014

13.13

1,831,000

HubSpot, Inc.*

Oct. 25, 2012

5.62

15,000,000

KaloBios
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.*

May 2, 2012

3.40

8,000,000

Malwarebytes Inc.

Dec. 21, 2015

10.37

35,000,000

Meituan Corp.†

Jan. 26, 2015

6.32

10,000,000

Mobileye N.V.*†

Aug. 15, 2013

34.90

8,878,000

Nutanix, Inc.†

Aug. 26, 2014

13.40

6,193,000

DocuSign, Inc.†

Security
Purchased
Preferred
Series D
Preferred
Series D
Common
Stock
Preferred
Series B
Preferred
Series B-1
Preferred
Series D
Preferred
Series E
Preferred
Series E
Preferred
Series E
Preferred
Series B
Preferred
Series D
Preferred
Series F
Preferred
Series E

62. See About Us, MOBILEYE, http://www.mobileye.com/about/ [https://perma.cc
/YQZ6-AENP]; Meituan.com, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization
/meituan-com#/entity [https://perma.cc/J2Q3-5Z4P (staff-uploaded archive)].
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Company

Acquisition
Date

Acquisition
Price per
Share ($)

Investment
Amount ($)

Pure Storage Inc.*†

Aug. 22, 2013

6.93

2,121,000

May 7, 2013

.91

11,000,000

Oct. 1, 2014

1.30

5,000,000

June 6, 2014

62.05

15,000,000

Total

134,526,000

Roku, Inc.
Uber
Technologies, Inc.†

*

Indicates that the company has gone public.

†

Indicates that the company is a “unicorn.”

1353
Security
Purchased
Preferred
Series E
Preferred
Series F
Preferred
Series G
Preferred
Series D

The following timeline provides a sense of the scale and timing of
these investments. Since its first investment in May 2012, Magellan
has consistently backed several startups a year. It had never invested
more than $15 million until more than tripling that amount in its
latest $35 million bet on Malwarebytes.63
Figure 1: Fidelity Magellan Startup Investments Timeline

The discussion above provides an overview of Magellan and its
investment practices without getting into valuation and returns data
63. See Fidelity Magellan Fund, Quarterly Holdings Report (Form N-Q) (Feb. 26,
2016).
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for the fund’s startup portfolio. This information is presented as part
of the investor-protection analysis below, in Section II.C.6., which
assesses the performance of the fund’s venture-style investments and
weighs the soundness of its valuations.
II. INVESTOR-PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Mutual funds’ recent interest in startups raises concerns about
investor awareness and fund liquidity, and about the competency and
motivations of mutual fund managers. While current mutual fund
regulations partially address these concerns, an analysis of Magellan’s
holdings, disclosures, and venture-stage firm valuations suggests that
the current rules provide insufficient protection.
A. Investor-Awareness Concerns
Mutual fund investors may not realize that their funds are
investing in startups. Ordinarily, investors might be relatively
unconcerned about the exact portfolio holdings of their funds. After
all, a major attraction of mutual funds is that investing decisions are
delegated to fund management. Venture investments, however, raise
special concerns.
Although investors delegate stock picking to the fund manager,
law and policy dictate that the investors’ reasonable expectations for
the contents of their portfolios set the boundaries of that authority.
Since mutual funds are known for investing in public securities,64 their
stakes in startups, which are private, are likely contrary to such
expectations. The only way to ensure that such investments align with
reasonable expectations is for funds to give meaningful notice to their
investors. The concern is whether they are providing it.
While the relevant securities laws make no explicit appeal to
“reasonable expectations,”65 the principle has purchase in this context
because of the contractual and fiduciary roots of the relationship
between the mutual fund managers and the investors.66 The
representations that management makes about its fund can be viewed
as outlining the terms of a contract between the fund and its investors,

64. See Steve Schaefer, Getting Into the Unicorn Boom: 10 Mutual Funds with Stakes
in Pre-IPO Tech Stars, FORBES (Oct. 14, 2015, 3:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/steveschaefer/2015/10/14/unicorns-funds-fidelity-trowe-uber-dropbox/#4b4409a02a92 [https://
perma.cc/T3G7-VBVM] (describing mutual funds as “players who do the bulk of their
work in public companies” and “largely composed of more liquid public stocks”).
65. See infra Section II.A.1.
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2012).
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who accept when they purchase their shares,67 and the principle that
reasonable expectations form contractual boundaries is a central
tenet of contract law.68 For example, when parties act in ways that are
counter to the reasonable expectations of their counterparties, they
violate the duty of good faith.69 Similarly, counterparties are only
bound to boilerplate terms if such terms comport with reasonable
expectations.70 By extension, mutual fund investments are only
appropriate if they match the reasonable expectations of the fund’s
investors.71 Given their history, investments in public companies like
Home Depot and Apple would fall within investor expectations,
while venture-style investments in private companies would likely fall
outside them.72 Meaningful disclosure—which would expand such
expectations—is the only cure.
Part of why such investments would otherwise fall outside
investor expectations—and why this is worrisome—is the unique risks
that startups, including unicorns, pose. Since startups are valued
internally,73 these investments present risks regarding the accuracy of
their valuations that are foreign to a portfolio consisting of the equity
of publicly traded firms, where valuation simply equates to market
prices. While other types of investments might also pose the risk of
faulty valuations, here that risk is especially acute. Because startup
valuation is particularly subjective, there is more room for error and
bias. These unique risks make meaningful notice all the more
important. For notice to be meaningful, funds must provide more
than just a note that startups are present; unless investors are also

67. For a discussion of the contractual nature of the mutual fund relationship, see
Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, Corporate Versus Contractual Mutual Funds: An Evaluation of
Structure and Governance, 69 WASH. L. REV. 927, 939–41 (1994). Lawsuits where
management is alleged to have violated the terms of the relationship, however, are
typically brought under the securities laws. See Richard L. Levine, Yvonne Cristovici &
Richard A. Jacobsen, Mutual Fund Market Timing, 52 FED. LAW., Jan. 2005, at 28, 32–33
(discussing legal theories underlying claims that funds failed to follow announced policies
regarding market timing).
68. See Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1431–32, 1432 n.2 (2014) (listing the
reasonable expectations doctrine as one of many core concepts of contract law); see also
Jay M. Feinman, Good Faith and Reasonable Expectations, 67 ARK. L. REV. 525 (2014)
(analyzing the role and importance of the reasonable expectations doctrine in contract
law).
69. See Feinman, supra note 68, at 557.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 64.
73. See discussion infra Section II.C.
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informed of the associated risks, they cannot plausibly be viewed as
informed.
Fiduciary law buttresses the conclusion that proper notice is
required. Because of the trust investors bestow in them, mutual fund
managers are fiduciaries of the funds they manage and, by extension,
their shareholders.74 Fiduciaries may not violate the reasonable
expectations of those whom they serve,75 and full disclosure is
required if candor is called into question.76 These longstanding
fiduciary doctrines suggest that—since investments in startups would
come as a surprise, and since the valuation of such investments raises
concerns about management integrity—mutual fund managers should
provide full and fair disclosure.
While investors might not normally focus on the precise contours
of their fund’s portfolio, startups are different. Core common law
principles dictate that when managers choose to invest in this unique
and heretofore largely unprecedented asset class that poses unusual
challenges, they provide investors with clear notice of the practice and
the concomitant risks.
1. The Relevant Securities Laws and Magellan’s Compliance Efforts
The securities laws, primarily the Investment Company Act77 and
the regulations thereunder,78 contain a number of rules designed to
provide investors with information about fund holdings and to
prevent misrepresentations with respect thereto. The rules about
quarterly reports, prospectuses, fund advertisements, and fund
naming conventions are all relevant. A survey of Magellan’s efforts to
comply with these regulations gives insight into whether the
requirements are effective. While the fund provides information
about startup investments in response to such rules, it does not do so
in a way that would be helpful to most fund investors. Since
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2012) (listing causes of action for breach of fiduciary
duty); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
BROKER-DEALERS 21–22 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V7D8-JU7J]; Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce
Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the
Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1017, 1021 (2005). Since the duty is
technically owed to the fund, private causes of action are derivative in nature. See Joy v.
North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982); Anita K. Krug, Investment Company as
Instrument: The Limitations of the Corporate Governance Regulatory Paradigm, 86 S. CAL.
L. REV. 263, 293–99 (2013); Langevoort, supra, at 1025.
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 383, 385 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
76. See id. § 390 cmt. a.
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2012).
78. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.0-1 to 270.60a-1 (2016).
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Magellan’s disclosures appear compliant, the lack of meaningful
information looks to be the result of a regulatory gap.
a.

Quarterly Reporting Obligations

Mutual funds are required to file quarterly reports,79 and these
forms must contain a listing of their investments.80 A knowledgeable
investor could pull the filings from the SEC’s website and see, at least
as of quarter-end, what firms were present. Investors might recognize
the unicorns; if not, an online search of unfamiliar names would
reveal their presence. As required, Magellan lists its holdings,
including unicorns and other startups, in these reports.81
Despite their inclusion, only sophisticated investors would be
able to pick out the investments in young firms and understand the
risks they entail. When Magellan and others invest in such companies,
they typically purchase shares in a particular series of preferred
stock.82 Since the rules require that funds include the nature of their
holdings in their quarterly reports,83 Magellan notes when it has
purchased this type of security.84 While seeing that a fund holds
shares in a series of a company’s preferred stock is a giveaway to
sophisticated investors that the issuer of such securities is probably a
startup, retail investors would likely miss the signal.85 Magellan never
plainly states that these are investments in venture-stage firms.
The reports also provide only hints that such firms are private
and the associated risks. Footnotes appended to these holdings reveal
that the securities are “restricted,” and Magellan explains therein that
restricted securities have not been registered under the securities
laws.86 Unbeknownst to the lay reader, this legal jargon means that
79. See id. § 270.30b1-5.
80. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OMB NO. 3235-0570, FORM N-CSR, Item 6
[hereinafter FORM N-CSR], http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-csr.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J9HM-34HT]; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OMB NO. 3235-0578, FORM N-Q,
Item 1 [hereinafter FORM N-Q], https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-q.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W5WA-ALDL].
81. See, e.g., FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 5–15 (2016) [hereinafter
FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT].
82. See Katie Benner, When a Unicorn Start-Up Stumbles, Its Employees Get Hurt,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/technology/when-aunicorn-start-up-stumbles-its-employees-get-hurt.html [https://perma.cc/PKY7-VS3R]; see
also supra Table 1.
83. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.12-12 (2016); FORM N-Q, supra note 80, Item 1.
84. See, e.g., FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 5–15.
85. Even sophisticated investors would need to conduct further research to be sure.
Such companies are not the only ones that issue preferred shares and, in fact, public
companies also issue them.
86. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 13.
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such securities are not publicly traded, and the companies in which
they represent an ownership interest may not be public either.87
Several pages later, in a discussion of “Significant Accounting
Policies,” the fund explains a key risk associated with private
holdings, noting that restricted securities “may be difficult” to resell.88
The fund does not further connect the dots in that it never informs
investors that, when securities are difficult to resell, the fund’s
valuation of those securities is in its discretion; nor, of course, does it
mention the inherent problems with the fund having such power.
While Magellan’s quarterly disclosures may provide enough for
sophisticated and diligent investors to be wary, this is of little comfort
given that mutual funds are aimed at the very people who would lack
the knowledge to find the relevant information in these reports and
then ascertain its meaning.89
b.

Prospectus Disclosure Requirements

The securities laws shape the mutual fund prospectus as the
primary resource for fund investors.90 As such, it would be a
promising location for disclosure of venture investments. At least in
Magellan’s case, however, meaningful disclosure is lacking.
The regulations require that the prospectus discuss, along with
the fund’s investment objectives, its principal strategies for reaching
those objectives, and the attendant risks.91 More detailed rules that
expand on these requirements dictate whether this broad disclosure
mandate means that funds that invest in startups must so disclose. As
noted, funds need only describe “principal” strategies.92 According to
the rules, whether an investment strategy is a “principal” one
“depends on the strategy’s anticipated importance in achieving the
Fund’s investment objectives[.]”93 To make this determination, in
addition to considering the amount of fund assets deployed pursuant
to a particular strategy, funds are also required to assess “the
likelihood of the Fund’s losing some or all of those assets from

87. See Rule 144: Selling Restricted and Control Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/rule144.htm [https://perma.cc/U5ES-82QD].
88. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 21, 26.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 46–49.
90. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2012); 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.0-1 to 270.60a-1 (2016).
91. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OMB NO. 3235-0307, FORM N-1A, Item 9, at 11
[hereinafter FORM N-1A], https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-1a.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SUN8-ATUB].
92. See id. Item 4, at 6, Item 9, at 11.
93. Id. Item 9(b)(1), Instruction 2, at 11.
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implementing the strategy.”94 As part of its principal-strategy
discussion, funds are to note, among other things, “the particular type
or types of securities in which the Fund principally invests or will
invest.”95
Finally, to meet the risk disclosure obligation, funds must
describe “the principal risks of investing in the Fund, including the
risks to which the Fund’s particular portfolio as a whole is expected to
be subject and the circumstances reasonably likely to affect adversely
the Fund’s net asset value, yield, or total return.”96 The wording of
these rules provides funds with a large degree of discretion in
choosing what to say and how to say it.
Magellan did not view such requirements as necessitating
disclosure of its venture investments. In a recent prospectus, the fund
describes its objective as “capital appreciation.”97 It explains that its
strategy for achieving capital appreciation is to purchase “growth” or
“value” stocks or both.98 As for the type of securities that underpin
this strategy, Magellan says it invests in equities, including “common
stocks, preferred stocks, convertible securities, and warrants.”99 It
decides how to allocate the fund’s money through “fundamental
analysis, which involves a bottom-up assessment of a company’s
potential for success in light of factors including its financial
condition, earnings outlook, strategy, management, industry position,
and economic and market conditions.”100 Finally, Magellan describes,
in general terms, three categories of fund risks: “Stock Market
Volatility,” “Foreign Exposure,” and “Issuer Specific Changes”—
none of which mention, or have special relevance to, startups.101
The fund’s broad descriptions of its strategy and the associated
risks fail to clearly indicate the presence of startups within the fund’s
portfolio. Though Magellan does allude to investments in preferred
stock,102 as noted above, few retail investors are likely to connect this
94. Id.
95. Id. Item 9(b)(1), at 11.
96. Id. Item 9(c), at 11.
97. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS, supra note 53, at 3.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id. Form N-1A also instructs mutual funds to discuss non-principal strategies and
the related risks in their SAIs. FORM N-1A, supra note 91, Item 16(b), at 19. Magellan’s
SAI contains no additional disclosures, however, perhaps because the fund views its
description of its principal strategies and risks as broad enough to capture all of its
investing activities.
101. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS, supra note 53, at 7–8.
102. See id. (defining “equity securities” as “common stocks, preferred stocks,
convertible securities, and warrants” under a heading marked “Description of Principal
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disclosure to the fund’s practice of investing in emerging firms. Nor
are the young companies in which the fund invests listed in the
prospectus.103 While Magellan’s sweeping generalizations about
strategy and risk theoretically capture venture investing, given the
historical practices and reputations of funds like Magellan, investors
would likely view these disclosures as pertaining to public equities.104
The institutional context means that only direct disclosures would
reframe investors’ reasonable expectations.
c.

Limitations on Mutual Fund Advertisements

Extensive rules pertain to mutual fund advertisements,105
including the contents of their websites,106 but the only relevant
requirement is that they not be materially misleading.107 This
backstop rule leaves mutual funds free to describe venture
investments, but nothing requires them to do so.
Magellan’s website makes no specific disclosures about its
investments in young firms.108 Rather, it reinforces the impression that
Magellan invests solely in big public companies. The top ten holdings
list a series of household names including Apple, Facebook, and
Wells Fargo.109 The included “Style Map” describes Magellan as a
large cap growth fund that focuses on companies valued at more than
$10 billion.110 The message is that Magellan managers seek to pick out
the best investments from the largest listed companies.111

Security Types” and acknowledging that “[t]he fund normally invests primarily in common
stock and securities convertible into common stock, but may also invest in other types of
securities in seeking its objective”).
103. See generally id. (containing no listing of venture firms).
104. See supra Section I.B.
105. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.482 (2016).
106. Mutual funds are subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933, see id., which limit sales practices over the Internet, see THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 1 LAW SEC. REG. § 2:29 & n.11
(7th ed. 2016).
107. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.156(a) (2016).
108. See Fidelity Magellan Fund: Summary, supra note 19.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. A particularly interested investor could find the fund’s list of holdings through a
“Prospectus and Reports” link on its website. See id. Investors are unlikely to take this
step, however, and, as noted, a portfolio list provides only part of what investors need to
know to understand the implications of their fund’s foray into venture investing. See
Section II.A.1.a.

95 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2017)

2017]
d.

MUTUAL FUND VALUATIONS

1361

Fund Name Regulations

A mutual fund’s name can play an important role in shaping
investors’ expectations.112 A clear and descriptive name could put
investors on notice that startups are present; a vague or misleading
one, on the other hand, could imply just the opposite. Despite their
potential to inform, the securities laws do not harness fund names as a
regulatory tool. Rather than prescribe that a fund’s name gives some
indication of its strategy, the rules police the boundaries of naming
practices.
The central rule is that names may not be “materially deceptive
or misleading.”113 In discussing this language, the SEC has said that a
name could be misleading if it does not fit the investment strategy of
the fund.114 Detailed rules police the fit issue in certain contexts.115
The rules require that if a fund’s name suggests that it will focus its
investing on a particular type of investment, like stocks or bonds, or a
particular industry or industries, it must adopt a policy that it will
invest eighty percent of its assets in accordance with those
representations.116 Essentially the same rule applies to funds
purporting to invest in certain geographic regions or countries and
those purporting to invest in tax-exempt instruments.117 If a fund’s
name lacks such specificity, the fund has a great degree of latitude.
The name “Magellan” takes advantage of this freedom. It
conjures the image of the famed Portuguese explorer, and in doing so,
suggests boldness and exploration, but ultimately provides no insight
into what is actually in the fund.

112. See Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen & P. Raghavendra Rau, Changing Names
with Style: Mutual Fund Name Changes and Their Effects on Fund Flows, 60 J. FIN. 2825,
2825 (2005).
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(d) (2012).
114. See Investment Company Names, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,828,
66 Fed. Reg. 8509, 8514 (Jan. 17, 2001) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-1 (2016)) (“In
determining whether a particular name is misleading, the Division will consider whether
the name would lead a reasonable investor to conclude that the company invests in a
manner that is inconsistent with the company’s intended investments or the risks of those
investments.”).
115. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-1 (2016); see also Investment Company Names, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 8509 (“Today the Commission is adopting new rule 35d-1 to address certain
investment company names that are likely to mislead an investor about a company’s
investment emphasis.”).
116. See § 270.35d-1(2)(i); Investment Company Names, 66 Fed. Reg. at 8510.
117. See § 270.35d-1(3)–(4).
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2. Summary—and a Note on Scale
Magellan never tells investors that it invests in emerging firms;
nor does it describe the risks that the practice entails. Even worse, the
two most likely sources of information—the fund prospectus and
website—leave investors with the contrary impression. In all
likelihood, the vast majority of the fund’s participants have no idea
that Magellan has transformed them into venture capital investors.
This is problematic even though, as of its March 2016 quarterly
report, Magellan had $166 million invested in venture-stage firms,
which is only 1.1% of its $15 billion asset base.118 I argued above that
notifying investors of venture investments is important because,
otherwise, such investments would fall outside their reasonable
expectations, and that adherence to such expectation was particularly
important here because of the fiduciary character of the managershareholder relationship and the potential for manipulation that such
investments give rise to.119 The relative size of a fund’s exposure vis-àvis the remainder of its portfolio does not alter that analysis. As is the
case with Magellan, the absolute stakes can still be large. Regardless,
because of the risk of misconduct, transparency is necessary even if
stakes are small (in relative or absolute terms).120
This idea is reflected in central doctrines from corporate and
securities law, which mandate disclosure when there is the risk of
manipulation, or where incentives are misaligned, even if the amounts
involved would otherwise appear inconsequential. Corporate law
requires complete disclosure of conflicts of interest regardless of
amount.121 Investment advisers, like Fidelity, are bound by the same
standard.122 The strict nature of these obligations stems from the

118. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 12. For the
calculations underlying this analysis, see Jeff Schwartz, Fidelity Magellan Spreadsheet (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 64–76.
120. Nor does it matter that losses would be spread across the fund’s many investors.
See Floyd Norris, Pile of Pennies Is Adding Up to a Scandal in Mutual Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2003, at C1 (discussing how small individual losses result in a windfall for those
who stand to gain).
121. See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (LEXIS through 2016 Legis. Sess.)
(providing that conflicts of interest render corporate transactions voidable absent full
disclosure); see also Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171,
1174 (Del. 1988) (“It is a basic principle of Delaware General Corporation Law that
directors are subject to the fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and disinterestedness.
Specifically, directors cannot stand on both sides of the transaction nor derive any
personal benefit through self-dealing.” (emphasis added)).
122. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 74, at 22. As part of its fiduciary duty,
an adviser must fully disclose to clients all material information that is intended “to
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fiduciary nature of the relationships at issue—management and
shareholder in the former and investment adviser and client in the
latter.
In addition, although “materiality” is the guiding principle for
disclosure in securities regulation,123 quantitatively immaterial
information has long been called for when there is the risk of
shareholder abuse. For example, nearly every detail of executive
compensation must be disclosed irrespective of the amount.124
Similarly, all conflict of interest transactions exceeding $120,000 must
be disclosed—a minute figure for even the smallest public
companies.125
More generally, the doctrine of qualitative materiality recognizes
that misstatements with respect to small amounts might be material if
they implicate management integrity. According to the SEC, a small
misstatement would be material, for example, if it increases
“management’s compensation[,]” “masks a change in earnings or
other trends[,]” or conceals an “unlawful transaction.”126
Although Magellan’s venture-style holdings are relatively small,
they still amount to an enormous sum, and even if the fund was less
exposed, the potential for misconduct inherent in such investments
militates in favor of disclosure nonetheless. That the presence of
venture investments, and the risks they entail, is never made clear to
investors indicates noncompliance by Magellan or a regulatory gap.
3. Inadequate Rules or Compliance Deficit?
While Magellan could have done more to inform investors, it
does not appear that the fund fell short of its legal obligations. One
could argue that, because of the large downside risk associated with
investing in startups, the strategy qualifies as a “principal” one
necessitating disclosure in the prospectus.127 But Magellan has a good

eliminate, or at least expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an investment
adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinterested.” Id.
(quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963)
(emphasis added)).
123. Cf. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (determining that,
under the standard of materiality cited in § 240.14a-9, a fact is material if “there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote”).
124. See Regulation S-K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2016).
125. See Regulation S-K, Item 404, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2016).
126. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,152 (Aug. 12,
1999).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 91–93.
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argument that even large losses would have a small impact on its
bottom line: even a 50% loss would be one-half of 1% of its total
assets. One could also argue that Magellan’s website is materially
misleading, but again the size of the investment cuts against this
position, and diligent investors can find holdings information linked
to the fund’s website.128 Finally, it could be argued that the principle
of qualitative materiality just described suggests that, notwithstanding
the language of the rules, Magellan should have included more
information.
But SEC guidance seems to bless the basic and high-level
disclosures that Magellan offers. Rule changes in 1998129 eased the
disclosure requirements with respect to fund strategies in an attempt
to render the documents less lengthy and complicated.130 In proposing
the rule, the SEC even expressed concern that companies were
unnecessarily discussing “illiquid securities” that were not part of a
fund’s principal investment strategy.131 The best interpretation of
Magellan’s conduct seems to be that it is complying with the rules,
such as they are, but the SEC did not foresee the venture-investing
trend and sanctioned a level of disclosure that leaves investors with
inadequate information.
B.

Liquidity Concerns

Startup investing also poses liquidity risk. The lack of a market
for venture investments runs contrary to the legally grounded investor
expectation that they will be able to redeem mutual fund shares
almost immediately.132 By rule, funds are required to redeem their
investors’ shares within seven days of such requests,133 but the
128. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
129. See Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 7512, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,916, 13,916, 13,920 (Mar. 13, 1998).
130. See Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 7398, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,898, 10,900 (Feb. 27, 1997).
131. Id. at 10,909. The SEC’s defense of its rule change includes the following:
The investments described often include instruments, such as illiquid securities,
repurchase agreements, and options and futures contracts, that do not have a
significant role in achieving a fund’s investment objectives. Disclosing information
about each type of security in which a fund might invest does not appear to help
investors evaluate how the fund’s portfolio will be managed or the risks of
investing in the fund. This disclosure also adds substantial length and complexity
to fund prospectuses, contributing to investor perceptions that prospectuses are
too complicated and discouraging investors from reading a fund’s prospectus.
Id.
132. See Guide for Investors, supra note 8.
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2012).
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industry norm is to do so within one day.134 Since holdings in venturestage firms are illiquid, and therefore unavailable to meet such
requests, if a large percentage of a fund’s portfolio is allocated to
them, a fund might be unable to meet its obligations in times of stress.
Such holdings also threaten other aspects of the fund’s strategy. With
these holdings unavailable for sale, other assets must be traded to
generate the cash to repurchase shares from investors even if a fund
would prefer to retain them.
Venture holdings are among the most illiquid financial assets.
Like other private firms, there is no active market on which to trade
such securities.135 Much debt, in contrast, while appropriately
described as illiquid, is often thinly traded.136 In times of stress, the
relative illiquidity of debt is problematic, but at least on a routine
basis there is somewhere to sell. That is not the case with startups.
To counter illiquidity risk and police the seven-day redemption
requirement, SEC guidelines limit mutual fund investments in illiquid
assets to 15% of their portfolios.137 The agency defines such assets as
those “which may not be sold or disposed of in the ordinary course of
business within seven days at approximately the value at which the
mutual fund has valued the investment[.]”138 Because the SEC has

134. See Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs; Swing Pricing; ReOpening of Comment Period for Investment Company Reporting Modernization Release,
Securities Act Release No. 9922, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,835, 80 Fed.
Reg. 62,274, 62,277 (Sept. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Liquidity Risk Management].
135. See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 556–60 (discussing the rise and decline of privateshare trading platforms like SharesPost and SecondMarket); see also Katie Benner,
Airbnb and Others Set Terms for Employees to Cash Out, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/technology/airbnb-and-others-set-terms-for-employeesto-cash-out.html [https://perma.cc/SL3A-BAEH]. The most likely avenue for a mutual fund
looking to exit would be a sale back to management or to a private equity buyer. See
VENTURE CAPITAL: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, STRUCTURES, AND POLICIES 396
(Douglas J. Cumming ed., 2010). To mitigate liquidity risk, there is evidence that funds
negotiate for greater redemption rights than other venture-stage buyers. See Chernenko et
al., supra note 6, at 23 (finding that redemption rights are fifteen percent more prevalent
in venture funding rounds where mutual funds are investing). Redemption rights,
however, offer little comfort. See Scott Edward Walker, Demystifying the VC Term Sheet:
Redemption Rights, VENTUREBEAT (July 4, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2011
/07/04/demystifying-the-vc-term-sheet-redemption-rights/ [https://perma.cc/7W4H-YFTY].
136. See Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,813–14 (stating that “most
money market portfolio securities are not frequently traded” and that “many debt
securities held by other types of funds do not frequently trade”).
137. Revision of Guidelines to Form N-1A, Securities Act Release No. 6927,
Investment Company Act Release No. 18,612, 57 Fed. Reg. 9828, 9829 (Mar. 12, 1992).
138. Id.
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said that shares in private companies presumptively meet this
definition,139 startup holdings count against the 15% cap.
In the context of equity mutual funds, where the remaining
holdings are predominantly in public companies, this 15% cap
provides ample protection.140 Thus, so long as funds are complying
with the rule, there is little concern that they will be unable to meet
their redemption commitments. And Magellan does not come close to
the 15% limit. The allocation to venture-stage firms in the period
studied never exceeded around 1%.141 Outside of one anomalous
quarter, its total investment in illiquid assets has remained below
2%.142 If other funds are behaving like Magellan, the illiquidity of
startup investments does not appear to be a large concern.
C.

Investment and Valuation: Management Competency and Candor

Although the illiquidity of startups may not pose a major threat
to the ability of funds to timely redeem investor shares, investing in
emerging firms and later valuing them raises significant concerns
about management competence and candor. While regulations do
little to directly police the competency of portfolio managers to invest
in and value startups, overlapping securities laws and accounting rules
contain a number of procedural and disclosure requirements designed
to instill rigor and honesty into the valuation process. Despite its
safeguards, however, this regulatory approach appears insufficient.
Judging by Magellan’s disclosures and valuations, the risk remains

139. Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding
Period of Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 6862,
Exchange Act Release No. 27,928, Investment Company Act Release No. 17,452, 55 Fed.
Reg. 17,933, 17,940 (Apr. 23, 1990).
140. See Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-1A, 57 Fed. Reg. at 9828 & n.9; Jason
Zweig, Buy the ETF, Not the Mutual Fund, WALL ST. J. (Dec 18, 2015, 1:19 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/12/18/buy-the-etf-not-the-mutual-fund/. Mutual funds are
also investing in other illiquid assets, which may pose liquidity challenges. See Stein, supra
note 16; Liquidity Risk Management, supra note 134, at 62,281. For that reason, the SEC
has proposed new liquidity rules that would complement the fifteen percent cap. See
generally Liquidity Risk Management, supra note 134, at 62,275–76 (proposing reforms
that would “address issues arising from modern portfolio construction[,]” provide “a new
pricing method[,]” and furnish “fuller disclosure of information regarding . . . [fund]
liquidity”).
141. For the calculations underlying this analysis, see Schwartz, supra note 118.
142. See id. This figure represents the portion of Magellan’s portfolio invested in Level
2 or Level 3 assets. See id. For a discussion of this nomenclature, see infra text
accompanying notes 205–08. In the fourth quarter of 2012, the fund had 4.4% of its assets
in one of these two categories, the vast majority of which fell in level 2. See Schwartz,
supra note 118.
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that management is making bad investments and then inappropriately
valuing them.
1. Why Improper Valuations Are a Problem
Bad investments are clearly harmful to fund shareholders, but
flawed valuations are problematic as well. In fact, because of the
central role that valuations play in mutual fund operations, the SEC
has referred to valuation accuracy as “a primary principle underlying
the Investment Company Act[.]”143
Once a mutual fund makes an investment, it is required to
ascribe a value to that investment each day.144 These daily valuations
are the key component of the firm’s net asset value (“NAV”), which
is the total value of the fund.145 When mutual fund shareholders
redeem their shares, they receive the per share NAV.146 This is also
the price at which fund shares are purchased.147 If this value is
incorrect, both redeemers and buyers will transact at the wrong
price.148
To see the problem with incorrect prices, assume a fund’s
venture portfolio and, by extension, its net assets, are overvalued.
Those redeeming their shares will receive too high a price and those
buying will pay too high a price. The excess returns the redeeming
shareholders receive are an indirect transfer from the remaining
mutual fund investors, who see the value of their holdings
inappropriately diluted.149 The buyers of overpriced shares would also
suffer if they redeem after the valuation has been corrected.
On a broader lever, exaggerated valuations cause a misallocation
of resources in the fund marketplace and between investors and
management. Buyers may have been wrongfully induced to invest in a
143. See Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,777.
144. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(b)(1) (2016).
145. See id. § 270.2a-4(a); Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,777 n.480.
146. See § 270.22c-1(a).
147. See id.
148. Unlike the prices of shares in a publicly traded company, which would adjust to
take into account the trading of sophisticated parties, fund NAVs remain static even if
they depart from fundamental value. While the disparity conceivably opens up a profit
opportunity that would be realized when the fund updates its pricing, the opportunity
would be difficult to exploit because it would be hard for investors to gauge the extent of
the mispricing and estimate the time frame for correction.
149. See Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,778 (discussing the impact
of redemptions at inflated prices on remaining shareholders). The impact would be felt
when valuations are rectified. At that point, the NAV will have been artificially reduced
by the exaggerated payment to the redeeming shareholder without an offset for the
inflated valuation.
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certain fund based on the inflated values, which would have
artificially exaggerated past returns. The inflated figures would also
have led to inappropriately high compensation for the managers,
whose pay is based on the NAV, and comes out of the returns of fund
shareholders.150 The multifaceted reliance on NAVs, and the potential
harms to investors and other funds that stem from inaccurate
estimates of its components, underlie the weight placed on getting
valuations right.
Valuing venture-stage firms correctly is important even if
inaccuracies would impact only a small percentage of a fund’s
portfolio—as is the case with Magellan151 and other mutual funds.152
While the effect on a fund’s per share NAV may be slight, that minor
error would impact every investor transaction that takes place at the
wrong price, magnifying it greatly. Also, even returns from a small
portion of a fund’s portfolio can meaningfully alter total fund
returns.153 While large moves can lead to changes measured in
percentage points,154 in the mutual fund industry, even a basis-point
change in total returns can alter a fund’s standing vis-à-vis its
competitors.155
2. Fund Manager Competence Concerns
There are a number of reasons to doubt the capacity of mutual
funds to make wise startup investments and then value those
investments accurately. Venture capital investing poses novel
challenges for fund managers who presumably have built their careers
investing in public companies.

150. See Jeff Schwartz, Mutual Fund Conflicts of Interest in the Wake of the Short-Term
Trading Scandals: Encouraging Structural Change Through Shareholder Choice, 2 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 91, 98 (2005).
151. See supra text accompanying note 118.
152. See KATIE REICHART, MORNINGSTAR, UNICORN HUNTING: MUTUAL FUND
OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE COMPANIES IS A RELEVANT, BUT MINOR CONCERN FOR MOST
INVESTORS 4 (2016), http://corporate1.morningstar.com/ResearchArticle.aspx?documentId
=780716 [https://perma.cc/RT6E-SPFA (staff-uploaded archive)]. Katie Reichart of
Morningstar downplays the significance of mutual-fund investments in unicorns because
these investments make up a small portion of the industry’s $8.6 trillion in assets. Id. at 1.
The allocation to startups relative to the size of the industry as a whole, however, is mostly
irrelevant for public policy.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 234–35.
154. See infra text accompanying note 235.
155. See Large Growth: Total Returns, MORNINGSTAR, http://news.morningstar.com
/fund-category-returns/large-growth/$FOCA$LG.aspx [https://perma.cc/36PW-5HEU
(staff-uploaded archive)] (showing closely clustered returns for large-growth mutual
funds).
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First, skills honed in the public markets do not readily translate
to the startup world. While the fundamentals of company valuation
are constant, the particular techniques involved differ greatly across
these different spheres. Valuing public companies involves poring
through SEC disclosures and press releases to obtain figures that get
plugged into models based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(“CAPM”) and its progeny.156 The key valuation figure is profits or
some stripped down version of it, like EBITDA.157 But startups
usually have no profits and CAPM plays, at most, a modest role.
Instead, valuation is based largely on guesstimates of the company’s
growth prospects.158 The process is much less mathematically rigorous
and much more dependent on relationships and experience.159
Second, the security being purchased is a different animal. On
the public markets, mutual funds typically invest in plain vanilla
common stock.160 Venture capital investments in preferred shares
involve much more complicated ownership and liquidation rights that
would be largely foreign to a public-markets devotee.161 Because
mutual fund managers do not live in the venture capital world, there
is a distinct possibility that they are buying at the peak of a startup
bubble.
Their inexperience in valuing startups also calls the subsequently
reported valuations into doubt. When mutual funds invest in publicly
traded equities, there is no risk of misreporting the carrying value of
those firms. Because there is a liquid market, and a precise market
price, the NAV calculation is a matter of arithmetic. Since startups
are private, however, there is no such market price. Nevertheless,
mutual funds must estimate a price each day—a task they are ill
equipped to perform.
Indeed, even valuation savants could not do what is being asked
of these venture capital neophytes. It is one thing to price Uber once;
156. See CHARLES P. JONES, INVESTMENTS: ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 226–33,
245–70 (11th ed. 2010).
157. See id. at 378 n.10.
158. See JOSH LERNER, FELDA HARDYMON & ANN LEAMON, VENTURE CAPITAL
AND PRIVATE EQUITY: A CASEBOOK 181–200 (5th ed. 2012) (describing venture capital
valuation techniques).
159. See Mary Jo White, Chairperson, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at
the SEC-Rock Center on Corporate Governance Silicon Valley Initiative (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-valley-initiative-3-31-16.html [https://
perma.cc/865C-L4NG] (“Nearly all venture valuations are highly subjective.”).
160. See, e.g., FIDELITY MAGELLAN, PROSPECTUS, supra note 53, at 7.
161. See generally NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, TEMPLATE: TERM SHEET FOR
SERIES A PREFERRED STOCK FINANCING (2013) (providing for, among other things,
governance rights, conversion rights, and preferred liquidation rights).
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it is another to reevaluate how internal and external events, nationally
and internationally, shape its prospects each day. It is not as if
startups are producing daily audited financials and business
retrospectives for NAV purposes; nor can fund managers scour the
global press each day for pertinent developments.162 Given these
limitations, fund valuations for young private companies are
inherently rough.163
Startups are even more difficult to value, both initially and over
time, than other illiquid assets. Mature private firms have historical
returns to survey. They are also likely to have public companies to
which they can be readily compared. The whole idea of startups, in
contrast, is that they lack close comparables.164
Likewise, as noted above, much debt that is described as illiquid
is at least thinly traded, which provides some market data.165 In
contrast, there is no market where startup shares are exchanged and
prices are publicly disclosed.166 The value of debt can also be more
easily modeled. Valuing startups is a guessing game, whereas mutual
funds can use “matrix pricing” for debt instruments, arriving at a
price “derived from a range of different inputs, with varying weights
attached to each input, such as pricing of new issues, yield curve
information, spread information, and yields or prices of securities of
comparable quality, coupon, maturity, and type.”167 While this process
does not assure accuracy, there is more to go on in the analysis than
there is when trying to figure out what Uber is worth. Moreover, at
least fund managers investing in and later valuing debt instruments
162. See Lizette Chapman & Drew Singer, Why Mutual Funds Can’t Agree on What
Unicorns Are Worth, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (May 19, 2016, 1:44 PM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-31/what-s-this-startup-worth-mutual-funds-can-t-gettheir-stories-straight [https://perma.cc/QBG9-MQDH] (“People that aren’t experts at
valuing private companies are trying to act like experts. . . . Even when they have less
information than the VCs.” (quoting CEO of Domo, Josh James)).
163. Some funds may be turning to third-party pricing services to assist in valuations.
See Sarah Krouse & Kirsten Grind, Wall Street Cop Asks Money Managers to Reveal
Silicon Valley Valuations, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2016, 5:57 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/wall-street-cop-asks-money-managers-to-reveal-silicon-valley-valuations-1481305082. If
these services are experts in the area, then outsourcing valuations to them relieves
competence concerns, although the inherent difficulty of the task means such valuations
would still be guesstimates.
164. This is not always the case. Dropbox, for example, has a great public
comparable—Box. See Box, https://www.box.com/home [https://perma.cc/6N4F-GQW6];
see also Michal Lev-Ram, How to Tell the Difference Between Box and Dropbox,
FORTUNE (Feb. 24, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/02/24/how-to-tell-the-differencebetween-box-and-dropbox/ [http://perma.cc/KF2H-YDX8] (comparing Box and Dropbox).
165. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
167. Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,813.
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for bond funds or money market funds (which are required to invest
in short-term debt)168 are ostensibly experts in debt. Unlike Magellan
and its ilk, they are not dabbling in something for which the fund
lacks historical expertise.
3. Fund Manager Candor Concerns
Mutual funds managers’ ability to accurately estimate the value
of startups at purchase or each day thereafter is one concern. Worse
still, there is a significant incentive for funds to massage the reported
valuations.
The most obvious abuse would be to exaggerate the value of the
startups in the fund’s portfolio.169 As previously noted, managers are
paid based on their assets under management.170 By inflating the
value of their investments, the asset managers make more. Inflating
valuations also increases returns, which attracts new investors and
increases the likelihood that existing ones stay.171 In addition, the
higher returns allow funds to outpace their peers and the benchmarks
to which they are compared.172
168. See 17 CFR § 270.2a-7(d)(1) (2016).
169. Hedge funds have recently drawn scrutiny for potentially overvaluing their illiquid
assets. See Jenny Strasburg, SEC Probes ‘Side Pocket’ Arrangements, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28,
2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703832204575210671819894474.
The incentive to inflate startup valuations may manifest as intentional misconduct or may
take the form of an implicit, even subconscious, bias toward higher values. Even a small
bias can have a large effect, however, because minor changes to assumptions can lead to
major changes to valuations. See LERNER ET AL., supra note 158, at 181.
170. See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 560 & n.221.
171. See id. at 546 & n.149.
172. It could be argued that fund managers would not have an incentive to overvalue
startups because the firms eventually go public and the price transparency associated
therewith would necessitate a valuation reckoning. There are several reasons, however,
why the incentive to inflate would overpower the countervailing force of this contingency.
First, many firms may never go public. As discussed above, IPOs are becoming less and
less common. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. If there is no IPO, there is
never a public-market price. Second, even if a firm goes public, the prospect of short-term
gains may very well trump the long-term risk. This was one of the many lessons from the
financial crisis and is seen repeatedly in managerial behavior. See generally Lynne L.
Dallas, Short-Termism, The Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L.
265 (2012) (providing a comprehensive exploration of why financial and nonfinancial firms
engage in short-termism and how to mitigate it). Moreover, fund managers compensated
based on the inflated values would not have to give the money back, so even if they need
to lower values at the IPO, they still would come out ahead. Indeed, a fund manager who
cheats may be long gone by the time of the IPO, particularly given that the time from
founding to IPO continues to lengthen. See Begum Erdogan et al., Grow Fast or Die Slow:
Why Unicorns Are Staying Private, MCKINSEY & CO. (May 2016), http://www.mckinsey
.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/grow-fast-or-die-slow-why-unicorns-are-stayingprivate [https://perma.cc/NM4S-V6GB]. Third, the valuations might become a selffulfilling prophecy (or managers might harbor this hope). If this were to happen, no
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Managers could also use their discretion over valuation to
smooth returns. Rather than consistently report inflated valuations,
funds could time shift changes so that they appear when most
advantageous or least harmful.173 Along these lines, funds could
report negative valuations when the remainder of the portfolio is
doing well and vice versa. This type of smoothing would reduce
volatility, which would make the fund appear less risky and therefore
more attractive. Funds could also smooth against their benchmark—
reporting gains when they need them to keep pace and reporting
losses when the fund can absorb them without falling behind.
While there is a similar opportunity for misconduct with other
illiquid assets, the concern is more salient with startups. The
slipperiness of venture valuations means there is a wide range of
plausible estimates, making biased ones difficult to differentiate from
mistaken ones. The more latitude for abuse, the more tempting it is
for funds to take advantage.
4. Fund Manager Competence Regulation
The securities laws do little to address the concern that mutual
fund managers are likely reaching beyond their expertise. Investment
advisers, like Fidelity, and their representatives are subject to a great
deal of regulatory oversight.174 While the rules set minimum standards
of professionalism,175 nothing assures investors that advisers are acting
in accordance with their core competencies. The primary protection
comes from disclosure rules, but these provide only limited insight
into the fund manager’s expertise. The rules require that funds report
in their prospectus the business experience of their top portfolio
managers for the last five years.176
Magellan’s responsive disclosure shows the limitations of this
rule and bolsters competency concerns. In a recent prospectus,
Magellan says that the fund’s portfolio manager, Jeffrey Feingold, has
managed the fund since 2011, and that he has been with Fidelity since
downward adjustment would be necessary. All of these considerations give managers
reason to inflate values even if IPOs are possible.
173. See RIAHI-BELKAOUI, supra note 13, at 56.
174. See generally DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION OF
INVESTMENT ADVISERS (2013), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman
/rplaze-042012.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TJR-KZG8] (delineating the regulatory
requirements for investment advisers and discussing SEC oversight). Investment adviser
representatives are largely regulated at the state level. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
supra note 74, at 15, 86–87.
175. See DIV. OF INV. MGMT., supra note 174, at 27–28.
176. See FORM N-1A, supra note 91, at Items 5(b), 10(a)(2).
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1997 as a research analyst and portfolio manager.177 These sparse
disclosures do little to help fund investors evaluate Mr. Feingold;
worse yet, the limited information provided suggests that he lacks
experience in venture-style investing. Outside sources confirm this
impression. According to the Wall Street Journal, prior to working for
Fidelity, Mr. Feingold was “an equity analyst following the footwear,
apparel and textile industries.”178 Whatever venture capital
experience Magellan has does not seem to come from Mr. Feingold.
While it is possible that the fund has made special hires to address this
area, investors would never know, as there is no basis on which to
assess the fund’s overarching expertise as it relates to this specialized
area.179
Even though regulation does not directly address competency
concerns—and what we know about Magellan’s portfolio manager
reinforces them—the nature of the fund’s investment practices
provides some comfort. As shown in Table 1, Magellan tends to invest
in later-stage startups, choosing to usually take part in Series D
rounds and later.180 These companies are less risky than brand new
ones181 and more similar to the public firms in which the fund typically
invests.
Moreover, Magellan often invests alongside venture capital and
other private equity funds.182 While these investors are fallible as well,
that experts in the area are investing on ostensibly the same terms
gives some legitimacy to the decision to invest. Surprisingly, however,
Fidelity has served as the lead investor for several of Magellan’s
investments,183 meaning that it has been the first to sign on and, in

177. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS, supra note 53, at 18–19.
178. Mary Pilon, Fidelity Magellan Gets New Helmsman, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904265504576568793213103996.
179. There were no media reports of venture experts moving to Magellan; it also seems
like an unlikely career move for already successful venture capital fund managers.
180. See supra Table 1.
181. See John H. Cochrane, The Risk and Return of Venture Capital, 75 J. FIN. ECON.,
Jan. 2005, at 3, 5.
182. See, e.g., Uber: Funding Rounds, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com
/funding-round/7a617d3521e9a71816c8d5cbcd4c49b0 [https://perma.cc/FFF3-VTLL (staffuploaded archive)] (showing funds that participated in Uber’s Series D round).
183. See Fidelity Investments, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization
/fidelity-investments#/entity [https://perma.cc/NS3E-N5XS (staff-uploaded archive)] (showing
Fidelity leading the rounds for Uber’s Series D, Roku’s Series G and F, and Cloudflare’s
Series D).
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those cases, has worked with the entrepreneur to structure the terms
of the funding round.184
Magellan’s practice of investing mostly in late-stage startups and
doing so alongside experienced venture capital investors generally
lessens competence concerns. But it does not eliminate them. Latestage startups are still startups, and even venture experts make
mistakes. Magellan also makes investments where these mitigating
factors are dulled. For example, Fidelity funds, including Magellan,
were the only ones to invest in the Malwarebytes $50 million Series B
round—and Magellan’s $35 million stake in the round made up about
twenty-one percent of the fund’s portfolio in private venture-stage
firms as of March 2016.185 Finally, the safety of being flanked by
venture-capital firms only lends confidence to the initial investment;
the fund’s subsequent valuations, regardless of who participated in
the funding round, remain suspect.186
5. Valuation Regulations
Because mutual funds have been investing in assets without a
readily determinable market value for years, the risk of incompetent

184. See Yong Li, Venture Capital Staging: Domestic Versus Foreign VC-Led
Investments, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF VENTURE CAPITAL 354, 360 (Douglas
Cumming ed., 2012).
185. See Press Release, Malwarebytes, Malwarebytes Raises $50 Million Investment
from Fidelity (Jan. 21, 2016), https://press.malwarebytes.com/2016/01/21/malwarebytesraises-50-million-investment-from-fidelity/ [https://perma.cc/XUS4-XL69]; see also Fidelity
Magellan Fund, Certified Shareholder Report (Form N-CSR) (Mar. 31, 2016) (showing
$35 million investment). Though $50 million is quite large for a Series B round, which
suggests that the company may have raised money prior to its Series A under a different
naming convention (e.g., Seed-1, Seed-2, etc.) without reporting it, this was not the case.
See William Alden, Malwarebytes, an Antivirus Start-Up, Raises $30 Million, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (July 10, 2014, 7:32 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/10
/malwarebytes-an-antivirus-start-up-raises-30-million/?src=twr&_r=0
[https://perma.cc
/7XUX-2FUG] (explaining how Malwarebytes raised its initial capital). Arguably,
however, the round’s size itself makes this investment look more like Magellan’s typical
late-stage entries. Even so, no venture capital firms participated in the round. See
Malwarebytes Raises $50M in Series B Funding, FINSMES (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www
.finsmes.com/2016/01/malwarebytes-raises-50m-in-series-b-funding.html [https://perma.cc
/WV77-VV5T].
186. A potential check on these later valuations is that, from time to time, Fidelity
invests with other mutual funds in the startup rounds, which also must publicly report their
valuations each quarter. See Scott Austin et al., supra note 42. When this is the case,
Fidelity, in addition to the other funds, may fear reporting outlier figures. This may lead to
increased caution. Less optimistically, however, the group dynamics may lead to herding
or outright copying of the first to report. One could also picture a feedback loop, where a
bubble forms among these funds as valuations ratchet skyward.
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or biased valuations has long been a concern for regulators.187 As
such, there is a regulatory regime in place to police pricing practices,
which consists of both securities laws and accounting rules. The
disclosures that Magellan produces in response to these
requirements—while they do not fully illuminate the efficacy of these
rules—provide grounds for concern.
a.

Securities Laws Regarding Mutual Fund Valuation Practices

The central valuation rule from the securities laws is that
“[p]ortfolio securities with respect to which market quotations are
readily available shall be valued at current market value, and other
securities and assets shall be valued at fair value as determined in
good faith by the board of directors of the registered company.”188
Since startup shares do not have a market price, this means that the
board needs to posit a “fair value” in “good faith.”
The SEC has provided guidance on the meaning of both terms.
According to the agency, “the fair value of a portfolio security is the
price which the fund might reasonably expect to receive upon its
current sale.”189 The “current sale” part of this definition means that
companies must calculate the price that the mutual fund would have
to accept today if it were to sell, which necessarily includes a discount
for the stock’s illiquidity.190
The fair value inquiry is meant to be comprehensive. Board
members are “to satisfy themselves that all appropriate
factors . . . have been considered.”191 Such an analysis is to include
consideration of both firm-level information and information about
external events.192

187. See Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,741 (discussing valuation of
thinly traded debt). See generally Restricted Securities, Accounting Series Release No.
113, Investment Company Act Release No. 5847, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,989 (Oct. 21, 1969)
(discussing valuation of private firms).
188. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(a)(1) (2016) (emphasis added); see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a2(a)(41) (2012).
189. Letter from Douglas Scheidt, Assoc. Dir. & Chief Counsel, Div. Inv. Mgmt., U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Craig S. Tyle, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst. (Dec. 8, 1999), https://
www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/tyle120899.htm# [https://perma.cc/3JK4-SWBP].
190. See Restricted Securities, Accounting Series Release No. 113, Investment
Company Act Release No. 5847, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,989, 19,990 (Oct. 21, 1969); Letter from
Douglas Scheidt, supra note 189.
191. Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 5120, Exchange Act Release No. 9049, Investment Company
Act Release No. 6295, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,986, 19,988 (Dec. 23, 1970).
192. See id.
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To comply with its duty to conduct the portfolio valuation in
good faith, the board members must act in accordance with “the
duties of care and loyalty that they owe to the fund.”193 More
specifically, the SEC has instructed as follows:
a fund board generally would not be acting in good faith if, for
example, the board knows or has reason to believe that its fair
value determination does not reflect the amount that the fund
might reasonably expect to receive for the security upon its
current sale. In addition, a fund board generally would not be
acting in good faith if it acts with reckless disregard for whether
its fair value determination reflects the amount that the fund
might reasonably expect to receive for the security upon its
current sale.194
Even though the rules allocate responsibility for valuation to the
board and provide it with good-faith guidance, in practice the board is
not expected to value securities daily. Rather, it must set up195 and
“continuously review”196 policies and procedures for management to
follow in conducting the valuations. According to the SEC, “these
policies and procedures should encompass all appropriate factors
relevant to the valuation of investments for which market quotations
are not readily available.”197
Disclosure requirements buttress the internal controls rules. A
mutual fund must explain its valuation methodology both in its
prospectus and SAI.198 Also, when a fund discloses its financial
statements, which occurs biannually, the fund must include a
discussion of its valuation procedures in the accompanying notes.199
193. Letter from Douglas Scheidt, Assoc. Dir. & Chief Counsel, Div. Inv. Mgmt., U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Craig S. Tyle, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst. (Apr. 30, 2001),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/tyle043001.htm [https://perma.cc
/8AJG-RYMS].
194. Id.
195. See Letter from Scheidt, supra note 189.
196. See Letter from Scheidt, supra note 193.
197. Inv. Co. Registrants, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,956
(Nov. 1, 1994). The board’s responsibility to set up internal controls to satisfy its valuation
obligations has also been read into Rule 38a-1 of the Investment Company Act, which
requires funds to “[a]dopt and implement written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to prevent violation of the Federal Securities Laws.” 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1
(2016); Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714, 74,415 (Dec. 17, 2003)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 275, and 279). Mutual funds also have an internal controls
requirement with respect to financial reporting, which also could be read to implicate fair
valuation procedures. See § 270.30a-3.
198. See FORM N-1A, supra note 91, at Items 11, 23.
199. See § 210.6-03.
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Finally, the values themselves need to be disclosed. Funds must
independently report the value of each holding every quarter.200 The
securities law regime thus boils down to a requirement that fund
boards enact, review, and update policies and procedures to value
illiquid investments and that funds disclose these protocols and the
resulting valuations.
b.

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles

Mutual fund financial statements must adhere to General
Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), which include extensive
rules on fair valuation in Accounting Standards Codification (“ASC”)
820.201 ASC 820 is somewhat more prescriptive than the securities
rules. It specifies general valuation methodologies (either based on
discounted income flows or comparisons with similar financial
assets)202 and a hierarchy of inputs in applying those methodologies.203
The key to the hierarchy is the distinction ASC 820 makes between
observable inputs, which are preferred, and unobservable inputs,
which are disfavored. Observable inputs are based on market data,
whereas unobservable inputs are based on the reporting company’s
assessment of “the assumptions that market participants would use
when pricing the asset.”204 In addition to the observable/unobservable
dichotomy, the ASC also groups inputs into three “Levels.”205 The
disfavored unobservable inputs are categorized as Level 3.206 Because
there is no market for startup shares, their valuation is based on these
inputs of last resort.
As with the securities laws, disclosure rules supplement the
procedural rules. The ASC requires a description of the fund’s
valuation methodology207 and a breakdown of total assets into
categories corresponding to how they were valued (i.e., through Level
1, Level 2, or Level 3 inputs).208
200. See FORM N-CSR, supra note 80; FORM N-Q, supra note 80; see also § 210.12-12.
201. See generally FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
UPDATE: FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT (TOPIC 820) (2011), https://asc.fasb.org
/imageRoot/00/7534500.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4AB-WWXL] (describing “common
requirements for measuring fair value and for disclosing information about fair value
measurements”).
202. See id. at 27.
203. See id. at 40.
204. Id. at 50.
205. See id. at 42–51.
206. See id. at 50; see also Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 15, at 47,858 n.1466
(providing an overview of the three-level structure).
207. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 201, at 59.
208. See id. at 61.
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Finally, auditors lend their assessment. Mutual funds must
include audited financial statements209 and an audited schedule of
investments in their annual reports.210 For the audits, rather than
confirm final valuation figures for difficult-to-value assets, the
auditors review whether “the fund’s valuation method was
appropriate in the circumstances and applied consistently.”211
In requiring that companies use certain valuation techniques,
describe their inputs, and subject their analyses to auditing, the
accounting rules require a degree of specificity beyond that which is
called for by the more flexible and general securities law rules. Even
so, Magellan’s compliance illustrates that these rules do not add
meaningful transparency and that manipulation concerns remain.
c.

Magellan’s Compliance with the Valuation Rules

Magellan’s disclosures shed little light on how it values its
venture investments. A recent prospectus contains several paragraphs
on valuation, but the only relevant disclosure is that “[i]f market
quotations, official closing prices, or information furnished by a
pricing service are not readily available or, in the Adviser’s opinion,
are deemed unreliable for a security, then that security will be fair
valued in good faith by the Adviser in accordance with applicable fair
value pricing policies.”212 An expanded discussion in the SAI provides
no further insight into startup valuations.213
The disclosures accompanying the fund’s financial statements
provide more detail, but are still too general to be useful. For
example, in an annual report for the fiscal year ending on March 31,
2016, the relevant disclosures are found in two paragraphs in Note 3
to its financial statements titled “Significant Accounting Policies.”214
The first paragraph is broadly responsive to the securities laws
requirements:
209. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-18 (2016); FORM N-1A, supra note 91, at Item 27(b)(1).
210. See FORM N-CSR, supra note 80, Item 6.
211. INV. CO. INST., INDEP. DIRS. COUNCIL & ICI MUT. INS. CO., FAIR VALUATION
SERIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO FAIR VALUE 19 (2005), https://www.ici.org/pdf/05_fair
_valuation_intro.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HNM-P4V4]. For other assets, the auditors will
independently verify valuations. Id. Fair value audits are recognized within the accounting
industry as among the most complex and problematic. See Emily E. Griffith, Jacqueline S.
Hammersley & Kathryn Kadous, Audits of Complex Estimates as Verification of
Management Numbers: How Institutional Pressures Shape Practice, 32 CONTEMP. ACCT.
RES. 833, 833 (2015).
212. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS, supra note 53, at 9.
213. See FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
25–26 (2016).
214. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 21–22.
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The Board of Trustees (the Board) has delegated the day to
day responsibility for the valuation of the Fund’s investments to
the Fidelity Management & Research Company (FMR) Fair
Value Committee (the Committee). In accordance with
valuation policies and procedures approved by the Board, the
Fund attempts to obtain prices from one or more third party
pricing vendors or brokers to value its investments. When
current market prices, quotations or currency exchange rates
are not readily available or reliable, investments will be fair
valued in good faith by the Committee, in accordance with
procedures adopted by the Board. Factors used in determining
fair value vary by investment type and may include market or
investment specific events. The frequency with which these
procedures are used cannot be predicted and they may be
utilized to a significant extent. The Committee oversees the
Fund’s valuation policies and procedures and reports to the
Board on the Committee’s activities and fair value
determinations. The Board monitors the appropriateness of the
procedures used in valuing the Fund’s investments and ratifies
the fair value determinations of the Committee.215
These boilerplate disclosures stop short of providing substantive
information about the valuation process. They note that the board has
put policies and procedures in place, but do not describe their
content. They also note that the board has delegated valuation to a
committee of “Fidelity Management & Research Company,” which is
the fund’s manager,216 but do not describe what the committee does
with any specificity. The second paragraph, which responds to the
accounting rules, adds little additional value:
Equity securities, including restricted securities, for which
observable inputs are not available are valued using alternate
valuation approaches, including the market approach and the
income approach and are categorized as Level 3 in the
hierarchy. The market approach generally consists of using
comparable market transactions while the income approach
generally consists of using the net present value of estimated
future cash flows, adjusted as appropriate for liquidity, credit,
market and/or other risk factors.217
Like the first paragraph quoted, this disclosure essentially confirms to
the public that Magellan is following the applicable rules, but

215. Id.
216. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, PROSPECTUS, supra note 53, at 5.
217. FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 22–23.
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provides no real transparency. The disclosure suggests that startups
are valued using Level 3 inputs, but does not describe the inputs or
the valuation technique the fund uses. Magellan’s disclosures appear
to follow the letter of the rule, yet sophisticated investors—let alone
average investors—are left with little insight into the actual valuation
process.
6. Magellan’s Valuations218
The final way to assess the risk to investors that remains despite
the relevant securities and accounting rules is to consider Magellan’s
ongoing valuations themselves, which might suggest incompetence,
exaggeration, or returns smoothing. To gain insight into whether
Magellan’s startup valuations may be suspect, this Section first
presents summary data on the fund’s quarterly valuations. It then
describes the returns and risk profile of the fund’s startup portfolio
(which are both functions of the underlying firm valuations) and
compares these attributes to the remainder of Magellan’s portfolio,
the public market, and the venture capital industry. Where Magellanheld startups went public, this Section also compares the fund’s
valuations to the market values of the same firms on the day of their
public offerings. While this collection of data, and the associated
comparisons, does not show that Magellan was dishonest or inept,
putting the fund’s venture investments in context does not extinguish
such concerns, and in fact, reinforces them.219

218. Unless a source is otherwise indicated, the calculations underlying the data
presented in this Section are on file with the North Carolina Law Review. See Schwartz,
supra note 118; EDGAR Search Results: Fidelity Magellan Fund CIK#: 0000061397, supra
note 60; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
219. It is beyond the scope of this Article to more formally test the hypothesis that
Magellan is manipulating its valuations. The data presented herein, though, suggests that
the additional data collection and statistical analysis necessary for doing so might be
worthwhile.
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Magellan’s Valuations and Valuation Practices

Between the second quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of 2016,
Magellan conducted 126 valuations of its venture investments. This is
one valuation each quarter for each of its holdings in emerging firms.
In 41% of the valuations, the fund chose to leave the estimated value
unchanged from the previous quarter. It increased valuations 32% of
the time and decreased them 27% of the time. Changes came in all
sizes. The fund made nineteen changes of less than 5% in either
direction. Its smallest change to a single holding was –.9% and its
largest was +141%. While the number of positive as compared to
negative adjustments was reasonably similar, the scale of the positive
adjustments was much greater than the negative ones. For example,
Magellan shows one loss of over 25%, but sixteen quarterly gains
surpassing that figure. The histogram in Figure 2 below illustrates
these practices.
Figure 2: Magellan Percent Change in Valuation Each Quarter

Magellan’s approach to valuation evolved over time. As the bar
chart in Figure 3 suggests, the fund was much less likely to change
valuations when it first began investing in venture-stage firms. From
June 2012 to June 2013, Magellan changed the value of only one
holding (out of fifteen opportunities). In contrast, from the first
quarter of 2015 until the first quarter of 2016, it changed forty-three
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valuations (leaving only seventeen unchanged). The chart below also
shows how Magellan’s holdings increased over time.
Figure 3: Magellan Valuation Changes

b. Risk and Return Data for Magellan’s Portfolio of VentureStage Firms
Magellan’s filings indicate that its venture portfolio has been
tremendously successful. Table 2 shows its initial investment in such
firms, its final valuation during the period I reviewed, and the
associated annual return. What stands out is just how well Magellan
reports to have done: the fund shows an average annual return of
42%.220

220. This is a weighted geometric average—a measure that takes into account how
much Magellan invests in each security and the timing of returns. See ROGER D.
IBBOTSON ET AL., DUFF & PHELPS, 2016 SBBI YEARBOOK: STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS AND
INFLATION 6-2 (2016) (presenting an explanation of geometric means).
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Table 2: Fidelity Magellan Fund Startup Returns
Company
bluebird bio, Inc.(a)
Cloudflare, Inc.

(b)

DocuSign, Inc.

Initial Investment
($)

Final Quarterly
Valuation ($)

1,711,000

13,489,000

(July 23, 2012)

(Sept. 30, 2015)

3,502,000

2,681,000

(Nov. 5, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

90,000

241,000

(Oct. 21, 2013)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

99,000

112,000

(Mar. 3, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

30,000

34,000

(Mar. 3, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

Yearly Return
(%)
116
–17
50
6
6

11,000,000
(June 29, 2012)

35,456,000

71,000

(Mar. 31, 2016)

36

(Mar. 3, 2014)

HubSpot, Inc.(c)
KaloBios
Pharmaceuticals,
(d)
Inc.
Malwarebytes Inc.
Meituan Corp.
Mobileye N.V.(e)
Nutanix, Inc.
Pure Storage Inc.

1,831,000

2,080,000

(Mar. 3, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

15,000,000

35,707,000

(Oct. 25, 2012)

(Dec. 31, 2015)

8,000,000

4,991,000

(May 2, 2012)

(Dec. 31, 2013)

35,000,000

35,000,000

(Dec. 21, 2015)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

10,000,000

12,214,000

(Jan. 26, 2015)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

8,878,000

46,431,000

(Aug. 15, 2013)

(Dec. 31, 2014)

6,193,000

6,093,000

(Aug. 26, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

2,121,000

4,148,000

(Aug. 22, 2013)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

6
44

–44

0
19
135
–1
29
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Roku, Inc.

Uber Technologies,
Inc.

Initial Investment
($)

Final Quarterly
Valuation ($)

11,000,000

18,570,000

(May 7, 2013)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

5,000,000

5,882,000

(Oct. 1, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

15,000,000

47,159,000

(June 6, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

[Vol. 95
Yearly Return
(%)
20
11
88

Average Yearly Portfolio Return

42221

Standard Deviation

53222

(a) bluebird bio, Inc.’s final valuation does not include the almost $6 million worth of
shares Magellan sold in the third and fourth quarters of 2015; the returns calculation,
however, accounts for the sales.
(b) Magellan’s June 29, 2012 investment of $11,000,000 and March 3, 2014
investment of $71,000 in DocuSign, Inc. were combined in Magellan’s reporting.
(c) HubSpot, Inc.’s final valuation does not include Magellan’s sale of about $8
million worth of shares in the first quarter 2015 and about $2 million worth of shares
in the third quarter of that year. Sales proceeds, however, are included in the returns
calculation.
(d) Magellan purchased an additional $3 million worth of shares in KaloBios
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in the first quarter of 2013. The returns calculation takes the
additional purchase into account.
(e) Mobileye N.V.’s valuation does not include $1000 worth of shares that Magellan
held until the first quarter 2015. The returns figure, however, takes this holding into account.

221. This is the average referenced above, see supra text accompanying note 220,
rather than a mean of the above annual returns.
222. This is the standard deviation of the startup portfolio’s annual returns.
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The bar chart in Figure 4 shows why Magellan has performed so
well. Most of its largest wagers yielded impressive returns. The few
investments resulting in losses involved relatively small stakes.
Figure 4: Magellan Startup Investments and Final Valuations223

The following Figure shows the returns associated with
Magellan’s valuations.
Figure 5: Magellan Startup Returns

223. Figure 4 combines multiple rounds of investments in Roku, Inc. and DocuSign,
Inc. Otherwise, it reflects the dollar figures in Table 2.
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Any discussion of portfolio performance must also account for
risk. Standard deviation is the typical measure, which is based on the
principle that the wider the dispersion of outcomes (in this case,
returns), the greater the risk.224 A higher standard deviation indicates
a wider dispersion.225 In Magellan’s case, the standard deviation of
yearly returns was fifty-three percent. This figure is based on a small
number of observations, but like annual returns data, it nevertheless
provides a numerical basis for comparison across different asset
classes over the same time period.
c. Comparative Analysis of Magellan’s Returns and Risks from
Its Startup Portfolio
Magellan’s venture investments significantly outperformed the
venture capital industry, the public market, and the remainder of its
portfolio. Table 3 shows how Magellan’s performance stacks up
against these comparables for the three years where there is complete
venture capital data.
Table 3: Yearly Return Comparisons226

June 30, 2012–
June 30, 2013

Magellan
Startup
Portfolio
(%)

Venture
Capital
Industry (%)

Magellan
Total
Returns (%)

S&P 500
Returns (%)

–6

6.5

20 (–.06)

21

224. See IBBOTSON ET AL., supra note 220, at 6-3.
225. See id.
226. The venture capital returns in Table 3 are internal rates of return (“IRRs”) based
on data from Preqin. See PREQIN, 2015 PREQIN GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE
CAPITAL REPORT: SAMPLE PAGES 7 (2015), https://www.preqin.com/docs/samples/2015Preqin-Global-Private-Equity-and-Venture-Capital-Report-Sample-Pages.pdf [https://perma
.cc/JQV9-PFJR]; PREQIN, PREQIN PRIVATE EQUITY BENCHMARKS: VENTURE CAPITAL
BENCHMARK REPORT 19 (2013), https://www.preqin.com/docs/reports/Q2_2013_Venture
_Capital_Benchmark.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G76-US86]; PREQIN, THE Q1 2016 PREQIN
QUARTERLY UPDATE: PRIVATE EQUITY 11 (2016), https://www.preqin.com/docs
/quarterly/pe/Preqin-Quarterly-Private-Equity-Update-Q1-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc
/XY4Q-D45C]; PREQIN, THE Q3 2016 PREQIN QUARTERLY UPDATE: PRIVATE EQUITY
11 (2016) [hereinafter PREQIN, Q3 PRIVATE EQUITY UPDATE], https://www.preqin.com
/docs/quarterly/pe/Preqin-Quarterly-Private-Equity-Update-Q3-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc
/J8L4-DHX4].
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Magellan
Startup
Portfolio
(%)

Venture
Capital
Industry (%)

Magellan
Total
Returns (%)

S&P 500
Returns (%)

June 30, 2013–
June 30, 2014

65

25.9

29 (+.15)

25

June 30, 2014–
June 30, 2015

101

20.5

11 (+.56)

7

59

18

20 (+.22)

17

Over ThreeYear Period

As Table 3 shows, from June 2012 to June 2015, Magellan far
outpaced the venture capital industry, earning a 59% return
compared to the industry’s 18%. Such performance is even more
remarkable because, as shown in Table 1, Magellan has usually
invested in later rounds, which should generate lower returns (and
lower risks). 227 Also, venture capital returns follow a power-law
distribution: a few funds earn outsized returns while the remainder
falter.228 That Magellan finds itself on the right side of this equation is
surprising,229 given that newcomers and non-venture funds that dabble
in private equity tend to do poorly.230
IRR calculations in the venture capital industry typically include interim
valuations and are not solely based on limited partner cash flows. See JOE STEER & COLIN
ELLIS, BVCA, ARE UK VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY VALUATIONS OVEROPTIMISTIC? 4 (2011). The numbers contained in parentheses in the Magellan total
returns column are estimates of the startup portfolio’s contribution to the total return each
period. Total returns and S&P 500 returns are based on data from Morningstar. See
Fidelity Magellan, MORNINGSTAR, http://beta.morningstar.com/funds/XNAS/FMAGX
/quote.html [https://perma.cc/84VT-PPJE (staff-uploaded archive)].
227. See Cochrane, supra note 181, at 5.
228. See DIANE MULCAHY, BILL WEEKS & HAROLD S. BRADLEY, EWING MARION
KAUFFMAN FOUND., WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY . . . AND HE IS US 21 (2012), http://
www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/2012/05
/we_have_met_the_enemy_and_he_is_us.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EWK-ML49].
229. See supra Table 3. Based on Cambridge Associates’ historical data, Magellan’s
returns would likely place it in the top quartile of venture capital funds. In the period from
1981–2014 (thirty-four years), this group had annual returns of over 30% in only eight
instances and over 40% in only five instances. See CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS., U.S. VENTURE
CAPITAL INDEX AND SELECTED BENCHMARK STATISTICS 8 (2016), http://
40926u2govf9kuqen1ndit018su-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Public2016-Q1-USVC-Benchmark-Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D83-F7H6].
230. See JOSH LERNER, PRIVATE EQUITY RETURNS: MYTH AND REALITY 21–24, 28,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/Session%20III%20-%20Lerner%20FINAL.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4DBJ-UHZS]. University endowments are the exception. See id. at 21–28.
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Also notable is that the strong venture capital returns depicted in
Table 3 belie a long history of lackluster performance in the industry.
While funds that began in 2010 have a median return of 14.5%, those
that began in 2005 show returns of only 3%.231 A Kauffman
Foundation study from 2012 concluded, based on returns data, that
venture funds “haven’t beaten the public market for most of the past
decade.”232 Magellan is thus a standout in the industry at a time when
the industry is doing particularly well.
Magellan’s venture returns also far exceed the stock market as a
whole and Magellan’s public investments. As shown in Table 3,
Magellan’s 59% return in the three years from June 2012 through
June 2015 dwarfs the 17% return on the S&P 500 index and 20%
return on the rest of the fund’s portfolio. Moreover, as noted above,
from June 2012 until March 2016, Magellan earned 42%.233 The S&P
500 returned about 14%, and the remainder of Magellan’s portfolio
returned about 14.6% over the same period.
The returns on Magellan’s startup investments have played a
small but noticeable role in the fund’s overall performance. As Table
3 indicates, the venture portfolio caused the overall return to fall six
basis points from June 2012 to June 2013 and to rise fifteen basis
points and fifty-six basis points in the following two years,
respectively.234 Table 3 does not show how the venture investments
impacted quarterly returns. As with annual returns, the change was
usually a matter of basis points, but one quarter—the first quarter in
2014—the fund had a 614% return on its startup portfolio, and that
quarter the venture portfolio increased the aggregate return by more
than 3% (from 7.8% to 11%).235
Magellan’s high venture returns have been accompanied by the
aforementioned 53% standard deviation,236 which implies a high level
of risk. The S&P 500 had a standard deviation of only 9% over the
three years included in Table 3. Historically, the standard deviation is
20% for large-cap stocks and 32% for small caps.237 Perhaps more
231. See William Alden, Venture Capital Outpaces Buyouts in Investment Returns, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 21, 2015, 12:59 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/21
/venture-capital-outpaces-buyouts-in-investment-returns [https://perma.cc/XLX8-8ZQ8].
232. MULCAHY ET AL., supra note 228, at 6.
233. See supra Table 2.
234. The small overall effect despite the large venture returns owes to the relatively
small portion of the portfolio allocated to startups. See infra Section II.A.1.b.
235. The 614% figure is an annualized return. For the underlying calculations, see
Schwartz, supra note 118.
236. See supra Table 2.
237. See IBBOTSON ET AL., supra note 220, at 2-6 Exhibit 2.3.
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surprising, the standard deviation of Magellan’s returns also exceed
those of venture capital funds, even though it focuses primarily on
later-stage startups, which should be more stable.238 For the three
years included in the chart above, the annual standard deviation in
venture capital returns is 10%, close to the venture capital average of
11.7%.239
These numerical comparisons, however, overstate the riskiness
of Magellan’s investments. Though less tidy, a better way to look at
risk in this context is to focus on the frequency and depth of losses.
This perspective causes Magellan’s risk to all but disappear. Only
three of the fund’s investments have failed to generate a positive
return,
and
only
one—KaloBios
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
(“KaloBios”)—is severely underwater.240
This is in contrast to venture capital as a whole, where three out
of four investments fail to return investor capital.241 Magellan’s focus
on more mature firms likely explains part of its success in avoiding
steep losses, but the increased stability of such firms should be
accompanied by decreased returns—which has not been the case for
Magellan.242 The fund appears to have done something that has long
eluded industry veterans. In its first foray into venture capital, it has
invested almost exclusively in winners. While not all of its investments
have been home runs, they have overwhelmingly yielded positive
returns. The spread of returns implies riskiness, but the risk that
matters is largely absent.
When further refined, the data continues to present this picture
of success. The above analysis of Magellan’s total returns from its
venture-type portfolio includes returns derived from after startups
have gone public. While a complete picture of Magellan’s returns
from its startup portfolio is a useful yardstick, since the valuations for
publicly traded firms and the post-IPO returns that stem therefrom
are based on market prices, excluding this portion of the fund’s

238. See Cochrane, supra note 181, at 5.
239. This is based on the variation in annual venture-capital returns reported by
Cambridge Associates. See CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS., supra note 229, at 6.
240. See supra Table 2.
241. Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 Out of 4 Start-Ups Fail,
W ALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10000872396390443720204578004980476429190.
242. See Cochrane, supra note 181, at 5.
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venture returns from the data presents a more precise picture of
Magellan’s pre-IPO valuation practices.243
When the public valuations are excluded, the average annual
return drops from 42% to 30%.244 The new figure, while somewhat
less impressive, still compares very favorably to the venture capital
industry (18.2%),245 to the S&P 500 (14%), and to the remainder of
Magellan’s portfolio (14.6%). Reduced risk accompanies the reduced
returns. The standard deviation drops to 31% and the fund’s biggest
loss disappears. Its investment in KaloBios only showed signs of
trouble after it went public. The reason for the overall reduced
returns and risk in the pre-IPO data despite KaloBios’s struggles
post-IPO is that Magellan’s investments in bluebird bio, Inc. (which it
held for more than two years after its IPO) and Mobileye N.V. (which
it held for a couple of quarters) skyrocketed after going public.246
d. Comparative Analysis of Firm-Level Valuations—Before and
After the IPO
Comparing the performance and risk of Magellan’s venture-stage
portfolio to those of alternative investments is one way to assess the
fund’s valuations. Another approach is to compare the fund’s private
valuations for firms that went public to the IPO prices for those firms
or, better yet, to the prices for those firms after the first day of
trading. The latter would be more telling because it reflects market
prices rather than the price paid by the IPO syndicate, which typically
reflects a discount.247 A good match between Magellan’s price and the
trading price would seem to indicate that Magellan is appropriately

243. Bluebird bio, Inc., HubSpot, Inc., KaloBios Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Mobileye N.V.,
and Pure Storage Inc. have gone public since Magellan’s initial investments in these
companies. See supra Table 1.
244. See Schwartz, supra note 118.
245. This 18.2% figure is the return for the venture-capital industry for the three years
ending December 2015. PREQIN, Q3 PRIVATE EQUITY UPDATE, supra note 226, at 11. Its
performance would place Magellan in the top quartile of venture-capital funds in about
70% of years. See supra note 229.
246. See Callum Borchers, Cambridge Biotech Raises $101M in IPO, BOS. GLOBE
(June 20, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/06/19/bluebird-bio-ipo-soarsfirst-day-trading/HxDvtzuKMlIf1CL4bAPm0L/story.html [https://perma.cc/8TEA-TMQC];
Gabriella Coppola & Leslie Picker, Mobileye Raises $890 Million as Largest Israeli IPO in
the U.S., BLOOMBERG (July 31, 2014, 7:53 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2014-07-31/mobileye-raises-890-million-as-largest-israeli-ipo-in-the-u-s- [https://perma.cc/WYH3PJHJ].
247. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Why I.P.O.’s Get Underpriced, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (May 27, 2011, 10:48AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/why-i-p-os-get-underpriced/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/E6ED-2R67].
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tracking the value of its investments.248 Table 4 shows this
information.
Table 4: Initial Public Offerings Data249

Company

Highest
Internal
Valuation ($)

Final Internal
Valuation ($)

IPO Price
($)

End of First
Day of
Trading

.78

.78 (14.80)

17

26.91

bluebird bio, Inc.

(March 31,
2013)

(March 31, 2013 /
May 28, 2013)

(June 18,
2013)

(June 19,
2013)

10.17

30.10

(Mar. 31,
2014)

7.50 (22.50)
(Sept. 30, 2014 /
Nov. 20, 2014)

25

HubSpot, Inc.

(Oct. 9,
2014)

(Oct. 9,
2014)

KaloBios
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.

3.40
(June 30,
2012–Dec.
31, 2012)
34.90

3.40 (12.11)

8

7.95

(Dec. 31, 2012 /
Feb. 28, 2012)

(Jan. 31,
2013)

(Jan 31,
2013)

(Sept. 30,
2013–June
30, 2014)

34.90 (6.98)

25

37

(June 30, 2014 /
Aug. 29, 2014)

(July 31,
2014)

(Aug. 1,
2014)

Pure

18.67

15.30

17

16.01

Storage

(June 30,
2015)

(Sept. 30, 2015 /
Nov. 30, 2015)

(Oct. 6,
2015)

(Oct. 7,
2015)

Mobileye N.V.

Inc.

248. Venture capitalists typically price their preferred shares as if they were common
stock, ignoring the value of the downside protection. Robert P. Bartlett III, A Founders’
Guide to Unicorn Creation: How Liquidation Preferences in M&A Transactions Affect
Start-Up Valuation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 123,
125 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Claire A. Hill eds., 2016). When it is clear that a
company is going public, however, the distinction evaporates because protection from
downside risk is irrelevant. Private and public valuations should, therefore, largely align
(although a liquidity discount to reflect any lockup period would be defensible).
249. The “Highest Internal Valuation ($)” and “Final Internal Valuation ($)” columns
are derived from Magellan’s quarterly reports. To access these reports, see EDGAR
Search Results: Fidelity Magellan Fund CIK#: 0000061397, supra note 60. The first dates
listed in the “Final Internal Valuation ($)” column are the quarter-end dates for the
quarterly reports reflecting the noted valuation. The second dates listed are the actual
filing dates for those reports. The prices in parentheses in that column represent what
the fund’s reported price equates to accounting for stock splits at or around the time of
the IPO and for the rate at which the fund’s holdings covert into common stock. For
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What stands out is how far off Magellan’s valuations were from
the market values of the same firms at the end of the first day of
trading. Magellan overvalued KaloBios by 34%. The fund’s valuation
was low, but reasonably close for Pure Storage Inc. (5% off), and far
too low for HubSpot, Inc. (34% off), Mobileye N.V. (430% off) and
bluebird bio, Inc. (82% off).
These discrepancies are difficult to explain. SEC rules provide
funds with sixty days from the quarter-end or more to file their
quarterly reports 250—and Magellan takes full advantage. As Table 4
shows, in four out of five cases, this meant that Magellan filed its
report listing its valuation estimate for the firm after its IPO. In the
other case, bluebird bio, Inc., Magellan filed about three weeks prior.
Thus, with the exception of bluebird bio, Inc., Magellan had actual
price data to inform its valuations. So informed, the fund’s valuations
for the quarter ending prior to the IPO should closely align with the
subsequent, but closely timed, market prices.
Looking more closely at the data, in two cases, Mobileye N.V.
and KaloBios, Magellan never changed its quarterly valuations prior
to the IPOs. HubSpot, Inc.’s and Pure Storage Inc.’s valuations were
lowered in the months prior to the public offering (which might
suggest an adjustment in anticipation of the event and the value
clarity it brings). As for bluebird bio, Inc., Magellan only held the
firm for three quarters prior to its IPO and marked up the stock by
fifty-six percent in the quarter prior to the offering.
A valuation process that, as law requires, takes into account all
available information should, it would seem, hew closely to proximate
market data. Because Magellan’s valuations for these five firms prior
to their IPOs show no discernable pattern that would help to explain
why that was not the case, the discrepancies remain a puzzle.

example, Magellan’s valuation for bluebird bio, Inc. for the first quarter of 2013, which
ended March 31, 2013, was $.78. Magellan filed the quarterly report listing this valuation
on May 28, 2013. See Fidelity Magellan Fund, Certified Shareholder Report (Form NCSR) (Mar. 31, 2013). bluebird bio, Inc. conducted a one-for-18.967 reverse stock split
shortly before its IPO, and Magellan’s shares were eligible to convert on a one-to-one
basis. See BLUEBIRD BIO, INC., PROSPECTUS 10 (June 18, 2013). Taking this into account,
the $.78 per share valuation, as of March 2013, equates to a $14.80 valuation at the time of
the IPO.
250. The first and third quarter reports are filed on Form N-Q, which have a sixty-day
deadline. See FORM N-Q, supra note 80, General Instructions, Section A. Form N-CSRs
are filed for the alternate quarters. These must be filed in seventy days. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.30e-1 (2016) (requiring semi-annual reports within sixty days of each half-year
period); FORM N-CSR, supra note 80, General Instructions, Section A (requiring filing not
later than ten days after delivery of a semiannual report).
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Returns Smoothing

As noted above, rather than inflate valuations so as to
exaggerate returns, funds could smooth returns by shifting the timing
of when they reflect gains and losses.251 If a fund is smoothing within
its portfolio, it would show up as an inverse correlation between the
fund’s return on its startup portfolio and the return on its remaining
investments. If a fund is smoothing against a benchmark (the S&P 500
in Magellan’s case), this would show up as an inverse correlation
between the performance of Magellan’s startup investments and the
remaining portion of the fund’s performance relative to its
benchmark. As illustrated in the scatterplots below, however, the
relevant figures showed little correlation.252
Figure 6: Startup Quarterly Portfolio Returns Compared to
Remaining Quarterly Portfolio Returns

251. See supra Section II.C.3.
252. The correlation coefficient for Figure 6 is –.05.
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Figure 7: Startup Quarterly Portfolio Returns Compared to Relative
Benchmark Performance253

One reason smoothing might not appear is that, when Fidelity
invests in a startup, it frequently spreads its holdings across more than
one fund.254 Thus, while Fidelity might not be smoothing with respect
to Magellan, it might be doing so with respect to the fund family as a
whole—timing the valuation of gains and losses to the benefit of
whichever fund in the family is most in need of support—and such
behavior would not reveal itself in the above analysis.
f.

Interpretation of Magellan’s Valuations

The data above does not provide a clear answer as to whether
Magellan is inappropriately valuing its startups. There is no evidence
of smoothing and no pattern of overvaluation in the pricing of firms
that went public. The comparison of private valuations to IPO prices
does, however, call the rigor of the valuation process into doubt, and
the comparison of venture-stage portfolio returns to other
investments supports concerns about misconduct.
Upwardly skewed valuations are one of only a few explanations
for the fund’s success in the venture capital arena. And the alternative
explanations, while plausible, are not overly compelling. It would be
tempting to dismiss Magellan’s success as the byproduct of a startup
bubble, but this would be too easy. While many have voiced concerns

253. The correlation coefficient for Figure 7 is –.03.
254. See REICHART, supra note 152, at 3.
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that startups are overvalued,255 to attribute Magellan’s performance to
a bubble requires an explanation for why Magellan is benefiting more
from it than others in the venture capital industry.256 No convincing
explanations present themselves. It is possible that Magellan is more
skillful, but this seems improbable given the fund’s inexperience. This
leaves luck. While anything is possible over a relatively short period
of time, ascribing Magellan’s performance to good fortune is not a
particularly satisfactory explanation either.
Surprisingly strong relative performance does not prove
manipulation or disprove other explanations, but it is notable
nonetheless. The valuation data could have shown that the venture
investments were an unrelenting drag on returns. While this would
not have disproven manipulation, it would have run counter to the
theory that mutual funds are using such investments and their
discretion over valuations to boost their returns in an absolute sense
and in comparison to index funds. Such a finding would also have
eased regulatory concerns. Even if funds are manipulating valuations
to show results that are less bad than they really are, doing so would
be part of a self-defeating investment strategy and therefore probably
a short-term problem. Instead, the finding of superior performance
lends credence to overvaluation concerns.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This Article proves, as much as a case study can, that mutual
fund holdings in venture-stage firms and the processes funds employ
to value these investments are not disclosed in a useful manner. It
also makes the theoretical case for skepticism regarding the
valuations mutual funds announce for their startup holdings each
quarter. To assess the theoretical case, this Article reviews Magellan’s
valuations and measures them against several benchmarks. While
Magellan’s valuations and the associated returns are comparatively
and surprisingly high, there is insufficient evidence to pin such success
on misconduct. Nevertheless, the above combination of theory and
255. See, e.g., Andy Kessler, A Dearth of Tech IPOs May Mask Bubble Trouble, WALL
ST. J. (July 9, 2015, 6:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-dearth-of-tech-ipos-maymask-bubble-trouble-1436482198; Steven Davidoff Solomon, Expect Some Unicorns to
Lose Their Horns, and It Won’t Be Pretty, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 19, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/01/20/business/dealbook/expect-some-unicorns-to-lose-their-horns
-and-it-wont-be-pretty.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/MS25-RYC7].
256. If there is a bubble, mutual funds might be part of the reason for why it exists.
Their presence may exert upward pressure on prices because they have vast resources and
their inexperience and discretion over subsequent valuations may lead to price
insensitivity.
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evidence—along with the mutual fund industry’s already sizeable
footprint in the venture capital space and its expanding taste for
venture-type investments257—provides enough reason for concern to
begin a conversation about reform.258
While disclosure is almost always the recommended cure for
securities concerns, that alone would likely be insufficient in this
instance. Many, even most, investors likely pay scant attention to
mandated fund disclosures or even the content of fund websites.259
While this does not mean the pursuit of improved disclosure is in
vain, it does suggest that substantive reforms to how mutual funds are
permitted to do business should be the centerpiece and that any new
disclosure recommendations should be calibrated to the reality of low
investor engagement.
A. Reforms to the Valuation Process and Related Disclosures
Currently, securities rules require funds to value their portfolios
daily, and the accounting requirements as to methodology allow funds
to do so through any reasonable means.260 Because funds are required
to constantly value their securities, this is a pure “mark-to-market”
accounting structure, and because the process of marking to market is
what creates the opportunity for manipulation, a modified cost-based
accounting structure would mitigate such concerns.
Funds could be required to hold these investments at their
acquisition cost, unless the fund believes a valuation change is
warranted based on publicly available information. For instance,
startups often announce their implicit valuation based on new rounds
of financing.261 When this occurs, funds could be required to update
their valuations accordingly. Management shakeups, acquisitions, and
even industry news could warrant changes.
257. See supra text accompanying note 43.
258. There is a regulatory tradeoff with respect to empirical evidence of misconduct:
the more evidence one collects, the better the case for regulation, but the more harm that
has already been done. While the case here is mostly theoretical, since the startup
investing trend remains nascent, this could present an opportunity for regulators to get
ahead of the industry.
259. See ABT SRBI, supra note 26, at 56, 78.
260. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2016).
261. See, e.g., Press Release, Genesys, Genesys Announces Investment from Hellman
& Friedman at $3.8 Billion Valuation (July 21, 2016), http://www.genesys.com/about
/newsroom/news/genesys-announces-investment-from-hellman-friedman-at-38-billionvaluation [https://perma.cc/FQ34-VM2R]; Press Release, Shazam, Shazam Announces
$30 Million Investment at $1 Billion Valuation (Jan. 20, 2015, 8:59 PM), http://news
.shazam.com/pressreleases/shazam-announces-30-million-investment-at-1-billion-valuation
-1107744 [https://perma.cc/8BK7-FBC4].
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As a complement to the new valuation rules, funds could be
required to disclose each quarter what public information caused the
change. This is a rather mild form of intervention because it leaves
pricing in the discretion of the fund and anticipates market-based
revisions.262 But the rationale for revised valuations would be subject
to public scrutiny, which would incentivize funds to provide more
conservative (and more careful) estimates—ones they could publicly
defend if called upon. Most mutual fund investors would be unlikely
to notice these disclosures, but the audience in this case would be the
SEC, class-action lawyers, and the media. Indeed, the SEC and major
newspapers have already begun to take note of mutual fund valuation
practices.263
Funds would likely argue that such disclosures pose competitive
concerns. As the opaque nature of their disclosures suggest, funds like
to leave the public in the dark as to their practices. Similarly, when
reporters have asked funds about valuation techniques, they are often
met with silence or platitudes.264 The disclosures proposed here,
however, would not compromise fund valuation models; only the
publicly available information on which changes are based would be
open for review. Such complaints are, therefore, unconvincing.
This proposal is the least intrusive from an array of options. The
most extreme alternative would be to prohibit mutual funds from
making venture-style investments, and instead allow only exchangetraded funds (“ETFs”) and closed-end funds to do so. While similar
to mutual funds, the shares for these pooled investments are publicly

262. Rules could also require disclosure of whether the fund is using a third-party
pricing service. The value of these services can be questioned: they might struggle to price
venture-stage investments, and they might be pressured to value such investments in
conformity with management’s wishes. Nevertheless, they have been shown to reduce
smoothing in the hedge fund context. See Gavin Cassar & Joseph Gerakos, Hedge Funds:
Pricing Controls and the Smoothing of Self-Reported Returns, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1698,
1700 (2011). While not necessarily probative of what would happen in the mutual fund
arena, evidence from Sarbanes-Oxley shows that disclosure of whether a publicly traded
firm adopts a shareholder-friendly practice leads to an increased adoption of that practice.
See James S. Linck, Jeffry M. Netter & Tina Yang, The Effects and Unintended
Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors, 22 REV.
FIN. STUDIES 3287, 3292, 3310–11 (2009) (showing an increase in the number of financial
experts on corporate boards after Sarbanes-Oxley required disclosure of whether
companies had such individuals on their audit committees).
263. See Kirsten Grind, Regulators Look into Mutual Funds’ Procedures for Valuing
Startups, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2015, 7:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/amp/articles
/regulators-look-into-mutual-funds-procedures-for-valuing-startups-1447796553; see also,
e.g., McLaughlin & Somerville, supra note 6; Sorkin, supra note 1.
264. See, e.g., Chapman & Singer, supra note 162; Grind, supra note 263; Sorkin, supra
note 1.
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traded, which means any disconnect between fund valuations and
market value would be accounted for in the price of the shares.265
Like in the public markets, unsophisticated shareholders would be
protected by the market price.266 The problem is that this would cut
many ordinary investors out from startup investing. ETFs and closedend funds do not have the same footprint as mutual funds, and they
are not as common in 401(k) plans.267 Without clear evidence of
misconduct, it is better to mitigate the risk of abuse than deprive
people of the opportunity to indirectly invest in young companies.
One could allow mutual fund participation, but remove the risk
of misconduct, by taking valuation discretion away from the funds.
Instead, they could be required to hold the investments at cost. In
contrast to the modified cost-based proposal presented above, with
this option, the market value would only enter the NAV calculation if
there is a liquidity event, such as the sale of shares in an emerging
firm. The problem, and the reason I propose milder intervention, is
that this change would open an arbitrage opportunity for
sophisticated investors. Suppose a company enters a later funding
round at an increased valuation. After the round, the fund’s recorded
NAV would be artificially low. Arbitrageurs could purchase shares in
the fund in anticipation of when the value would actually be realized.
The same is true on the flip side. A requirement to hold the firms at
cost would mean that funds would carry inflated valuations for firms
in cases where there has been bad news. Arbitrageurs could sell fund
shares only to repurchase them if the firm eventually goes
bankrupt.268
The underlying problem is that a purely cost-based system
creates a predictable divergence between announced values and
market values. In a typical public market, the actions of sophisticated
traders help retail investors as their conduct brings prices in line with
market values. But in the mutual fund context, the NAV stays the
same. The profits of the arbitrageurs come at the expense of long-

265. See How to Invest in a Closed-End Fund, WALL ST. J., http://guides.wsj.com
/personal-finance/investing/how-to-invest-in-a-closed-end-fund/ [https://perma.cc/U2XBPWTC].
266. See Jeff Schwartz, The Law and Economics of Scaled Equity Market Regulation,
39 J. CORP. L. 347, 362 (2014).
267. See How to Invest in a Closed-End Fund, supra note 265.
268. Even with small allocations to emerging firms, large valuation discrepancies could
develop, which would render such strategies profitable. For a discussion of the economics
of arbitrage, see Schwartz, supra note 266, at 376.
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term, presumably retail, investors.269 Under the modified cost-based
approach I propose, however, while a difference between market
price and reported price difference might exist in theory, it would be
impossible to exploit because the information on which to do so
would not be publicly available.270
A similar alternative would be to require updating, when and
only when, there are certain outside events (e.g., a new funding
round, an acquisition, bankruptcy). The ability to alter valuations
subject to these constraints would allow greater flexibility than the
purely cost-based alternative. While this approach would reduce the
arbitrage problem, it would not eliminate it. Sophisticated investors
could buy or sell based on whatever events are not included on the
list.
Additional research might indicate that more restrictive
measures are appropriate, but at this point, when research is still thin,
incremental change seems most prudent. The suggested alteration to
the valuation process, and the accompanying disclosure rule, would
provide a great deal more investor protection than today’s regime
without significant upheaval.271
B.

Startup Portfolio Disclosure

A limitation to the changes discussed thus far is that they would
not address the investor notice problem. The SEC and sophisticated
investors would be more aware of fund valuation practices, but the

269. This would be a form of stale-price arbitrage. For a discussion of the topic and the
harm to shareholders it causes, see generally Eric Zitzewitz, Who Cares About
Shareholders? Arbitrage-Proofing Mutual Funds, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 245 (2003).
270. Corporate insiders would be in position to profit based on price inaccuracy, but
trading based on material nonpublic information would constitute insider trading. See, e.g.,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Litigation Release No. 21,383 (Jan. 20, 2010), https://www.sec
.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21383.htm?_ga=1.93175768.479061596.1482959610 [https://
perma.cc/X79S-GHCC] (describing SEC action for insider trading against mutual fund
manager for trading based on inside information about the mispricing of certain fund
assets).
271. Hedge funds face a similar valuation concern in connection with the illiquid
aspects of their portfolios. To address the risk that some investors may cash out at
inappropriate valuations, some funds have adopted so-called “side pockets.” See
Strasburg, supra note 169. Illiquid securities are kept in the side pocket and proceeds from
such securities are only distributed to shareholders after a liquidity event. See id. The
practice is controversial. See Gregory Zuckerman & Scott Patterson, ‘Side-Pocket’
Accounts of Hedge Funds Studied, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2006, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj
.com/articles/SB115465505123626547. While such an arrangement might be feasible for
mutual funds, it would run afoul of the bedrock idea that mutual fund shares are quickly
and fully redeemable, and it introduces a degree of complexity that might elude
shareholders.
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presence of venture-stage firms in fund portfolios, and the risks they
pose, would still be unknown to most investors. As noted above, this
problem is difficult to fix because investors are notoriously
uninterested in fund disclosures.272 With this in mind, rules should
mandate disclosures across an array of platforms, including both fund
advertisements and SEC forms, so as to reach as many investors as
possible, and require that such disclosures be simple and clear enough
so that those investors that come across them understand that the
fund is investing in startups and the risks involved. This practice
would provide actual notice to some investors and constructive notice
to all.273
Such an approach starts with a rule that instructs funds with
venture investments to include something like the following
disclaimer whenever they present their fund strategy, including in its
website and prospectus: “This fund contains investments in startup
companies. Such investments pose unique risks, which are discussed
in further detail in the ‘Startup Portfolio’ section of our Statement of
Additional Information.”
This section would then describe such risks. It would explain that
such firms are illiquid and that this may make it difficult for funds to
redeem mutual fund shares on demand. Funds could appropriately
tailor this discussion according to the portion of the fund’s portfolio
so invested. Funds would also be required to explain the valuation
challenges with startups. In particular, funds should indicate that
valuing startups is inherently subjective and that exaggerated
valuations lead to excess compensation for management, which
means that the interests of the fund’s managers do not necessarily
align with those of its shareholders.
The fund would then explain the process it uses to value startups
and address concerns regarding its discretion and potential bias. In
this part, the fund would describe what it does rather than what it may
do. For example, at least one fund tries to use market behavior of
similar public companies to estimate emerging firm values.274 When
this is the case, then firms should acknowledge it. One problem with
today’s disclosures is that fund’s provide a broad discussion of their
process for valuing assets without a readily identifiable market value.
Because they apply this process to a range of assets, the discussion is
272. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
273. Constructive notice, while less than ideal, would be an improvement on the status
quo where disclosures provide little notice and investors are exposed to amplified risks
because of the flexible valuation rules. See discussion supra Sections II.A.1.b, II.C.
274. See, e.g., Chapman & Singer, supra note 162.
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so general as to be meaningless. This proposal would require that
firms specifically discuss what they do to fair value startups. To
accommodate competitive concerns, funds would not be required to
disclose the details of their valuation models. In the example above,
for instance, a fund using public valuations to inform private ones
would not be required to list which public company or companies it is
using as a match for which startup.
The SAI would also inform investors that the current list of
holdings, including valuations, can be found in the fund’s quarterly
reports. In addition, it would explain that the fund, as required by
law, updates valuations when, and only when, publicly available
information warrants doing so, and that it reports the basis of such
changes each quarter. In the quarterly reports, startups should be
specially marked as such with a footnote indicating that investors can
learn more about such investments and their risks in the fund’s SAI.
This specific and clear disclosure regime would offer far more insight
than the generalized and superficial information found in Magellan’s
reports today.
Even though the SEC has expressed concern about the length
and complexity of fund disclosures, venture investing warrants special
treatment. As discussed throughout this Article, such investments are
uniquely illiquid and difficult to value and are quite different than the
typical equity mutual fund holdings or even holdings in debt and
other illiquid securities. Though the substantive reforms discussed
above would mitigate concerns in connection with the startup
valuation process, they would not eliminate them or the need for
transparency with respect to funds’ venture portfolios.
CONCLUSION
A case study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s compliance effort and
investing practices suggests that the current regulatory structure does
not adequately address the investor-protection concerns raised by
mutual fund investments in startups. The study suggests that most
fund investors are unaware that they have indirectly invested in these
companies, which is particularly worrisome because fund valuations
for these firms might be biased and inaccurate. A review of
Magellan’s valuations, and the performance related thereto, lend
preliminary support to these concerns.
To respond to the investor-protection gaps, I propose greater
limitations on how funds may value their investments in startups and
enhanced disclosure requirements with respect to the valuation
process, the presence of such firms in fund portfolios, and the risks
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that investing in startups entails. While mutual funds have only
recently begun imitating venture capital firms, they already own
billions of dollars worth of equity in early-stage companies,275 and
their exposure to this asset class is rising sharply.276 Rather than wait
until the concerns outlined in this Article lead to clear investor harm,
regulators can respond to the endemic problems with such
investments in the mutual fund context and enact preventive
regulations to mitigate the risks.

275. See supra text accompanying notes 41, 43.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 42–44.

